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   This dissertation is about the mind-body problem, specifically the knowledge argument which challenges 
the thesis of physicalism, which is a mainstream metaphysical thesis in western philosophy that the universe 
and everything in it conforms to the condition of being physical and that all truths are ultimately made true 
by physical facts.   My analysis will follow the structure of a recent book-length treatment of the knowledge 
argument which also argues in support of substance dualism, which is the metaphysical thesis that the 
universe also contains mental items which do not ultimately conform to that condition of being physical:        
Howard Robinson, 2016, “From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind”.   
   My primary motivation is not to evaluate the book but rather to mirror the scope and relevance of 
Robinson’s thesis for a program of study.  I slant the focus more to issues most alive for philosophers today, 
and less on historical approaches like behaviourism and analytic functionalism, except where that 
consideration is more broadly enlightening such as Davidson’s anomalous monism.  Two very short chapters 
are effectively editorial references for completeness so the reader may reference those topics I judge least 
important given limits on word count.  The case for substance dualism which I consider does focus on the 
thesis presented in the book as a contemporary case for dualism from Robinson who is a leading proponent 
in the field.   
 
THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT. 
   There are a group of epistemic arguments against physicalism which purport to show that consciousness is 
not entirely physical, i.e. that consciousness is constituted by something more than the brain and its nervous 
system.  They aim to show that there is an ontological gap exhibited by facts of experience and physical facts, 
founded on an epistemic gap between physical truths and experiential truths.  
   The Knowledge Argument is a prominent member of that group, of which there are several versions, but 
Frank Jackson (1982) is credited with the strongest (Nagasawa 2003), though Robinson himself independently 
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around the same time presents a very close equivalent (Crane 2019).  The argument takes the form of a 
thought experiment and here I will present my own version which is all but equivalent while forestalling 
unhelpful behaviourist style objections:  Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who has lived her whole life with 
monochromatic lenses implanted in her eyes at birth so that she can only see in black, white, and grey shade.  
She has learnt everything there is to know about the physics of colour and the physiology of how the brain 
perceives colour, indeed everything there is to know in physical terms about the processes of colour vision.  
She knows all the physical information there is to know ranging from spectral wavelengths through to the final 
neural processes that operate when we see colour, including the precise mechanism that may cause the vocal 
cords to utter something like, “There is a red tomato”.  For her fortieth birthday they substitute the chromatic 
lenses for normal lenses.  When the anaesthetic wears off and Mary wakes, she sees a red tomato and 
experiences colour for the first time.  Does she learn anything new?  Yes, she learns what it is like to experience 
red.  If this experience presents her with a new fact about colour, then the claim is that physicalism is false.  
The intuition is supposed to be that Mary obtains new factual knowledge about seeing red that she could not 
have deduced from all the physical information she knew previously.  Here is a more rigorous formulation of 
the intuition by Chalmers (2002): 
 “Let P be the complete microphysical truth about the world, and let Q be a truth stating that 
phenomenal redness is instantiated… Then the initial moral of the knowledge argument is that Q 
cannot be deduced from P by a priori reasoning. That is, the material conditional 'P ⊃ Q' is not 
knowable a priori.” (p281). 
 
The crux of the argument is the inference from the epistemic claim about colour blind Mary’s knowledge to 
the ontological claim refuting physicalism. 
   There are various types of objections to the knowledge argument which I address:   
- Outright denial that she learns anything new. 
- Dispute regarding the a priori link between physical and phenomenal knowledge. 
- The phenomenal knowledge from seeing colour is not a new fact ‘that’ – it is not propositional.  Rather 
it is knowledge that provides Mary a new ability or know how.  
6 
 
- The experience provides her with new understanding or representation of facts that she already knew.  
This can be understood as her coming to learn an a posteriori necessity like in the scientific mode 
where water is discovered to consist of H2O. 
- The phenomenal-concept-strategy aims to show that her lack of a priori insight is generated by her 
ignorance of a certain sort of phenomenal concept, which she only acquires upon seeing colour. 
   Where it makes no substantial difference I will use the usual parlance from Jackson’s thought experiment of 
“Mary before she leaves the room” for her monochrome state, and “outside the room” or suchlike to signify 
her with no lenses and seeing normally.  The balance of attention amongst these responses will reflect my 
judging the weight of allegiance among working philosophers, for example giving more attention to the 
phenomenal concept strategy and less to Dennett’s proposal about Mary anticipating what colour looks like.  
  Part One occupies two thirds of the dissertation researching standard physicalist responses to the knowledge 
argument mainly independent of Robinson, though prompted by his treatment and mirroring his chapter 
numbers to aid the reader who cares to assess that book in parallel.  None of those responses are found to 
be satisfactory.  Then follows a treatment of scientific reduction and supervenience.  Part two takes up the 
remaining third and engages directly with Robinson’s arguments for ‘conceptualism’ which he advances in 
support of certain categories of mind dependent entities intended to motivate dualism, to which I mainly 
object.  The final chapter occupies just ten percent of the dissertation, reflecting a similar portion Robinson 
allocates for what I take to be no more than a preliminary case for substance dualism, and again to which I 
object.   For reasons of space it was necessary to bracket and miss out portions of Robinson’s treatise which I 








CHAPTER ONE.     Setting the Scene and Topic Neutrality. 
 
   In this opening chapter Robinson provides a logical map for the overarching aspect of his negative thesis 
against physicalist responses to the knowledge argument. I will mainly lay out those elements of most 
relevance for my treatment with little argumentation or objection at this point because his entry points are 
broad, but understanding how Robinson sets up the debate will help with the big picture before I take up an 
analytic focus in the rest of the dissertation.   
  Identity theory is presented as the beginning of modern physicalist attempts to relate first-person experience 
to the physical, and he argues that all attempts since then effectively amount to the same proposal, that the 
mind and brain are identical.  The identity theory, most famously of Smart (1959) and Armstrong (1961) 
emphasised the notion of topic neutrality and this is a key notion running through Robinson’s responses to 
physicalism.  The identity is of brain processes and experience, so instances of each are not merely correlated, 
but are the same thing.   I was confused about the meaning of topic neutrality when I first encountered identity 
theory years ago, I guess because it is very counter intuitive;  when I dream a vivid image in my mind’s eye of 
an apple, so that in some sense what is going on in my head is no different from what happens when I 
experience a real apple, then my subjective report about the apple can be said to be topic neutral regarding 
the neural activity and the seeing; neutral as referencing either the neural event or the phenomenal image, 
because they are identical.  The idea is that the correct reference of topic neutral identities could be picked 
out without ascribing intrinsic properties and could be established empirically.  In this way topic neutrality is 
a conceptual device to bracket the counter intuitiveness that when we refer to a phenomenal image, we are 
picking out nothing but a physical event or state with only physical properties.  Nagel (1974) coined an 
expression referring to the essential first-person subjective aspect of an experience as there being a, ‘what it 
is like’ to a perceiver.  We may refer intuitively to the subjective first person impression by ‘what it’s like’, 
which acts like a broad catch all phrase for whatever appears to the subject, and the topic neutral conception 
will exclude those essential properties of that what-its-like for the observer.  Properties such as redness and 
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brightness and perhaps beauty, which are radically unlike the physical properties constituted by those 
activated neurons also involved in the experience.  I will take advantage of the convenient catch-all nature of 
the ‘what-its-like’ expression, and will use it frequently throughout the essay where appropriate (so that it’s 
use does not blur important distinctions or beg the question).  However, it does not roll off the tongue so I 
ask the reader to commit the abbreviation WIL to memory. 
   Robinson argues that while topic neutrality might seem a tempting answer to the knowledge argument, it 
doesn’t touch the argument and it is important to see why, because he judges that all subsequent physicalist 
accounts which jettisoned topic neutrality are actually forced back to it and are open to the same or very 
similar objections.  Before we get specifically to the knowledge argument in relation to topic neutrality, 
Robinson specifies three essential features of every identity theory and how the topic neutral concept is a 
persistent incoherence in physicalist positions which has been overlooked and neglected:  
(i) “Conscious states are identical to neural states. 
(ii) Neural states possess only those properties recognised by physical science.  There are no 
‘emergent properties’. 
(iii) We are not explicitly aware of those physical neural properties in being aware of our own conscious 
states.”   (p.5) 
The intrinsic mental state consists only of physical properties, but our first-person mental awareness does not 
reveal those properties, so first-person knowledge of mental states is said to be topic neutral.  Some 
physicalist theories do not appeal to topic neutrality by arguing for token-identity whereby particular instances 
of mental states are identified with particular physical states, instead of the type-identity invoked by Smart 
and Armstrong whereby experiential mental types are types of brain event. Robinson argues that this 
difference does not change their commitment to all three features.  Robinson characterises other next 
generation physicalist theories as attempts to ground the experiential aspect of the mental state in some 
other relation than identity: those citing supervenience, realisation, or functional role.  Robinson concedes 
they might hold some chance of explaining propositional states such as standing beliefs or facts in memory 
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which could be represented by abstractions without phenomenal properties, but not they cannot capture the 
raw feel component of mental states which are certainly not abstract, and so he will argue they fail to throw 
off the essential features of topic neutrality.   
  Robinson narrates the historical interplay of debate between Ryle, Chomsky, Quine, Putnam, and Dennett, 
which he interprets as attempts to skirt around the identity theory of Smith and Armstrong (and then David 
Lewis) before the real crux of the matter was noticed by Nagel and then Jackson.  He tells us in sweeping 
terms that scientific method and how we perceptively infer meaning from the world conflicts with the 
intuition of our being immediately aware of sensations and not any supposed physical essence constituting 
that sensation.  I will wait until later chapters for those objections in more detail and argue that his notion of 
‘conceptualism’ which motivates those arguments is unsound. 
  Robinson spells out a different sort of objection which he believes is conclusive.  Those next generation of 
token identity theories offer an improvement over Armstrong because they specify the identity between the 
functional role of a brain state and the WIL (‘what-its-like’).  He takes issue with a common analogy that 
functionalists use which substitutes brain events with states of computer hardware, because the causal 
significance of the neuronal state which realises or subvenes the mental event is determined by context, with 
immediate downstream neurons carrying the behavioural significance of the supervening experience, which 
they achieve because of their connecting setup.  That neural-causal identity cannot be secured because, 
“behavioural dispositions are, so to speak, long-term dispositions, and not immediate ones, and cannot be 
identified with a specific central state or its causal output.” (p.9)  I take his diagnosis to mean that causal role 
and neural identity cannot configure a synchronic state, because the causal role of a brain process depends 
on its context, and different downstream neural states lose (or ‘forget’) the contextual significance of earlier 
states, so equating causal role with neural identity will not do the work required.  I will push back on Robinson’s 
objection because the issue is far from clear cut, as he provides is no principled reason why the level of 
computing complexity could not parallel the complexity of causal relations that is happening at the mental or 
behavioural level.  The subject of computing hardware performing brain functions is a field of research in its 
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own right, which I will just note as a point of interest for further research, taking Robinson’s objection as 
suggestive but inconclusive. 
  Robinson targets topic neutrality from a different angle.  If Mary knows all the facts, then coming to know 
something of a general sort in a topic neutral fashion will not add anything knew.  A subject having enjoyed 
an experience knows exactly what that experience is like, or we might say if the experience just is the knowing 
WIL, then learning something general about that experience will not bring new information about the 
experience in-itself, and this rules out topic neutrality under writing further information about that event.  
Robinson illustrates what he means; if you know Fred is in the garden, then being told that someone is in the 
garden will lack any new information for you.  Knowing all the physical facts, if physicalism is true, then learning 
what seeing red is like is an epistemic parallel to be being told that someone is in the garden after you already 
know who is in the garden.  I suspect a faulty a notion of physicalism is allowing the scope for this charge, 
because it seems to imply that Mary in the room should know everything in the room related to the experience 
of red and physicalism need not entail all experiential facts or it isn’t clear why knowing the physical realizer 
identity must be an item of more general knowledge than facts about the WIL.  Supported by Van Gulick 
(2004), I will argue for different ways of knowing an experiential fact which is compatible with physicalism. 
  Robinson contends that at least one of the three essential criteria for an identity theory which entail topic 
neutrality must be dropped by the physicalist, and there is only room to drop the first criteria of identifying 
conscious states with neural states.  He thinks any standard form of physicalism which involves sensations as 
occurrent events will entail topic neutrality.   
  The rest of the Chapter more fully introduces the knowledge argument with some clarification:    Jumping 
off from my introduction chapter, Frank Jackson includes in the facts which Mary learns before leaving the 
room "…all the causal, relational,...and functional roles consequent upon all this...otherwise we can suppose 
there is more to know than every physical fact...and that is what physicalism denies." (1986, p291).  Robinson 
attaches two preliminary points that may help us later: The character of what Mary learns from WIL is the 
phenomenal feel of an object in the world.  She is not aware of only an internal state because that state is a 
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transparent view of an object in the world; the knowledge argument involves what is termed the transparency 
of phenomenal consciousness (Moore 1922), by which our experience is not of an internal mental object but 
is of what causes that experience.  Secondly, the knowledge argument may lean either on the thought that 
Mary learns something new on her release or that she lacked knowledge before release.  Robinson claims 
nothing important depends on this distinction, but it will help us avoid potential complications with Dennett 
and aspects of the ability hypothesis if the formal specification of the argument stands on what she lacks while 
still in the room.    
  Robinson discusses a couple of arguments related to the knowledge argument (which I will not address: 
Chalmer’s conceivable zombie and Levine’s explanatory gap, pp.13-18), which he sees as distracting 
philosophers from the core of the knowledge argument which is independently sufficient to refute 
physicalism.  All three related arguments together cast an overarching explanatory gap best uncovered by the 
knowledge argument between physical explanation and mental explanation:  that gap may be interpreted 
either de re or de dicto; de re is how conscious properties relate to physical properties, and de dicto is how 
psychological explanations relate to physical explanations.  
   Before narrowing on the specific type of objections to the knowledge argument in coming chapters, the core 
issue they target is what way, if any, coming to experience colour can be framed or characterised as gaining 
knowledge she had previously lacked.  The four types of responses which I mentioned in the introduction and 
where I will address them: 
 
1. An outright rejection that Mary lacks nothing cognitively before leaving the room.  She could work out 
and anticipate what it is like to see colour.  Robinson sees this as the boldest objection, which is most 




2.    Mary acquires a new ability on her release, which is a gain of know how, rather than factual or 
 propositional knowledge that.  This approach is mainly associated with David Lewis and functionalist 
theory of Mind.  Chapter 3.   
 
3. Mary gains a new way or mode of knowing something.  She comes to know phenomenally what  she 
already knew theoretically.  This is known in the literature as the phenomenal concept  strategy and 
attracts allot of attention so I will consider different variations of that strategy in  chapter 5.  The 
phenomenal concept strategy is aligned with the abilities objection by Frank  Jackson himself who 
changed his mind about the knowledge argument and came to think of  the acquired ability outside the 
room as a capacity to represent a neural state in a peculiar sort  of experiential way (chapter 4). 
 
4.    Mary lacks but then acquires factual knowledge about the nature of phenomenal colour, which 
 David Lewis calls phenomenal information. The new knowledge is not propositional but is advanced as 
knowledge by acquaintance, which is argued to be factual information about the nature of colour and 
colour experience.  Robinson contends that the knowledge by acquaintance interpretation is required to 
support a thesis of property dualism which he sees as the only plausible response by a physicalist to the 
knowledge argument and claims that part one of his book will show this.   
 
  Property dualism might support the thesis of a non-reductive physicalism, which involves mental properties 
supervening or depending in some way on a physical base.  It is controversial whether property dualism is 
consistent with a thorough going physicalism, which the chapters of part two will analyse with ideas around 
scientific reduction, before we then consider the positive case for substance dualism in part three.  Like I said 





Chapter 2.  Daniel Dennett. 
 
  Dennett denies that Mary is ignorant of WIL before leaving the room, in a straight denial of the knowledge 
argument intuition.  Robinson accuses Dennett of the “Jericho method”: aiming to dissolve the knowledge 
argument with nothing more than dialectic and no arguments.  This position deserves space in the 
dissertation, but not much, so I have attempted to locate the most pertinent and instructive aspects.  Over 
the years Dennett develops three characterisations of Mary aiming to pump-prime different intuitions.  
Starting with Mary’s blue banana (Dennett 1991) as just an illustration (it doesn’t reach the level of intuition) 
that Mary could work out WIL from the science, then adding substance to how she would achieve that 
awareness as ‘Swamp Mary’ and ‘Robo Mary’ (Dennett 2007).   
   Dennett wants to make out that if Mary pre-release knew everything about the physical processes, then she 
will know WIL.  He tells a story of Mary on her release being shown a blue banana and recognises that she 
was being a tricked because she already knew that it would normally be yellow.  Her observers are bemused 
about how she could possibly recognise the difference between yellow and blue to know from sight that the 
banana should not look like that, and that they were fooling her.  Also, Mary understands their puzzlement, 
because she knows everything about colour, yet they do not.  Robinson interprets that Dennett could have 
one of two possible rationales for how this could happen.  Either a standing disposition of verbally responding 
to certain wave lengths of light, “that is yellow”, grounded in his functionalist understanding.  Or otherwise 
Dennett is assuming a sort of omniscient awareness of matter, whereby Mary could correlate particular brain 
states with seeing blue, but for that Mary would need to observe states of her own brain when exposed to 
yellow and blue, which by hypothesis has never happened before.   
  Dennett effectively accepts that judgement about the blue banana story (2007, fn1), which renders his 
original article just a blunt denial of the knowledge argument intuition, then attempts to develop his position 
with two further thought experiments:  Swamp Mary and Robo Mary.  A Lightening strike hits Mary while she 
is in a swamp and spontaneously alters her physical constitution into the same state as if she were normally 
14 
 
experiencing red.  Robo Mary is a robot in the form of a replicated human with the ability to program herself 
into that same state which the lightening caused in Swamp Mary.  Dennett doesn’t put it like this but in effect 
we are invited to transition from the “…logically possible cosmic accident path…” (2007 p.25) of Swamp Mary 
seeing red, to the parallel plausibility of Robo Mary deliberately manipulating herself into that same state.  To 
satisfy the knowledge argument we need to know how Robo Mary might achieve her ‘seeing-red 
configuration’.  Swamp Mary achieves that state by fiat, but the task for Robo Mary is programming herself 
from the science, which would require her to deduce the WIL state from the facts and that raises afresh the 
problem targeted by the knowledge argument.  Or perhaps we might see Robo Mary as introducing the ill-
posed problem of imagining WIL for a robot to see red.  Dennett muddies the water (2007 pp25-29) by 
drawing parallels with original Mary who might acquire the seeing-red state by rubbing her eyes or 
spontaneously daydreaming or such like and Robo Mary who can engineer herself into that state with 
interventions all described in pseudo-computer jargon which only beg the question about how.  He eventually 
faces the crux of his task with Robo, “What matters is whether Mary (or Robo Mary) can deduce what it's like 
to see red from her complete physical knowledge, not whether one could use one's physical knowledge in 
some way or other to acquire knowledge of what it's like to see in colour.” (Ibid p.29)  He claims that there is 
no clear separation between deduction and other forms of “knowledgeable self-enlightenment” (Ibid p.29), 
such that we should baulk at the thought of Robo adjusting herself and programming herself deductively from 
the science.  He suggests the adjustment is only comparable to experiencing in the shoes of others through 
empathy and imagination. 
  Robinson contends that distinction is irrelevant, and that the crucial difference between RM and colour-blind 
Mary is the former putting herself into a state, in contrast to the task of working out from 3rd person scientific 
information what that state is like.  Dennett’s blurring of that gap seems connected to his behaviourist stance, 
claiming that the newly acquired post-experiential property is dispositional.  But the question is, disposed for 
what?  A system being disposed to experience red is different from experiencing red.  Let’s say I am now 
physically disposed to experience whatever I may encounter, that is the physical aspects of my nervous system 
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are configured such that they only have to receive a sensation to be activated, the mental state I acquire upon 
that encounter is something added to the dispositional physical base.  I might be accused of begging the 
question against dispositionalism by simply pleading that the WIL is an extra component to the disposition, 
but it seems the onus is not on me.  Dennett seems to think that it is, “"...the richness we appreciate [WIL], 
the richness that we rely on to anchor our acts of inner ostension and recognition is composed of and 
explained by the complex set of dispositional properties..." (2007, p19-20, my parenthesis).  Robinson 
presents nuanced arguments about behaviourism and functionalism missing out qualitative subjective 
properties (here and more extensively in the next chapter).  I will only engage with those arguments where it 
is particularly helpful because they have been rehearsed ad nauseum over the years and their conclusions are 
widely accepted.   
  Robinson aims to show that Dennett’s behavioural cum functionalist stance renders Mary’s scientific 
omniscience irrelevant by boiling down the problem to MBB and RM supposedly being able to work out mental 
states from scientific knowledge under certain conditions: but why he asks should that be necessary if there 
was no difference between knowing how Mary would react verbally or otherwise and knowing WIL. 
  Before discussing recent philosophy which may bare on Dennett’s notion of a person’s ability to evoke WIL 
with empathy and imagination, I will just mention Robinson positing of another Mary variation to illustrate 
Dennett's predicament (2016, pp32-33): 'Extremely Observant Mary' (EOM) has no special scientific 
knowledge but finely tuned social skills to observe reactions.  I will offer a much-enhanced EOM in favour of 
Dennett which better drives home the point.  My EOM enjoys normal life unimpeded apart from her 
monochrome lenses and has the scientific knowledge of original Mary, while those fine social skills are 
supported by perfect memory for cataloguing all incidents of people reacting to colours.  Even my OEM will 
not make more plausible Dennett's behaviourist intuition that she could bring on the mental disposition to 
imagine red.   
  A different way into this could be Mary dreaming the red experience (Dennett 2007 p23), which potentially 
lends plausibility to the idea of her evoking WIL at will, by voluntarily imagining that same WIL while awake.  
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Even if we grant for arguments sake that Mary could dream in red, her mental state would not have come 
about from scientific inference or otherwise from her learning and so the knowledge argument is untouched.    
  Churchland (1985, p25) connects daydreaming with an ability of Mary to correlate the image with a certain 
spiking frequency in her visual cortex allowing her to identify the image with a neuroscientific concept.  This 
move runs into the same problem mentioned earlier that she would need to observe her own brain while 
observing colour which is off limits, while also raising further questions (that I will not consider) about Mary's 
experience of red in relation to a 'normal' experience of red and colour predicates in public language. 
    I will offer an argument from my intuition which involves speculation about psychology.  Our ability to 
imagine unfamiliar experiences may depend on what I will call a ‘similarity-spectrum’: for example, comparing 
a medium pitch noise we have never heard to be ‘in-between’ low and high pitch noises on a similarity-
spectrum of pitch.  It is plausible that the ability to imagine operates with a similarity-spectrum framed by 
previous experience, and in this case enabling us to imagine a pitch between the low and medium or the high 
and medium.  The philosopher Amy Kind (2019) sets up a similar notion and suggests an imaginative 
scaffolding that Mary might employ, with which she charitably reads Churchland having in mind as regards 
Mary’s imaginative ability (2019, p174).  Kind accepts that such considerations will not be decisive, but that 
they may help inform the reasonableness of the idea of Mary imagining colour.  Kind describes a fictional 
example from an award-winning novel in which the writer apparently empathises with an autistic boy, and 
she credits the author with successful imaginative empathy even though it involves "relatively distant 
imagining" (Ibid p.175).  I take ‘relatively distant’ to mean in my terms that the novelist is leaning on a 
similarity-spectrum of empathy that can provide a quite limited imagining of the autistic boy’s experience of 
empathy.  
  Kind presents a real-life example which she suggests might somewhat help imagining WIL to be a bat:  Animal 
scientist Temple Grandin (2006) claims the ability to adopt a perspective of seeing like a cow, which has 
enabled her to successfully design equipment to handle livestock: "I place myself inside its body and imagine 
what it experiences.  It is the ultimate virtual reality system." (taken from Kind 2019, p.176).  I am inclined to 
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resist Kind’s charitable reading of Churchland because there is a total lack of similarity-spectrum in the case 
of colour, as I aim to illustrate, and which helps resist Dennett’s argument that Mary could imagine colour.  If 
the autism case is relatively distant on the empathic similarity-spectrum (for one thing empathy is not 
quantifiable) and seeing like a cow is relatively close because the altered perspective is simply lower to the 
ground with a different shaped body, then I suggest colour is altogether different because there is no 
imaginative-access-scaffolding to make the transition from monochrome to colour, as there is for the 
difference in height and shape between humans and cows or lowered empathy in the autism case.  For this 
sort of reason Robo Mary cannot bare the intuitive weight that Dennett claims for her in terms of imaginative 
abilities; whereas one might imagine grey shades in between black and white, I do not begin to fathom how 
one could imagine, say seeing orange (having never seen it), without the imaginative scaffolding provided 
from previously experiencing red and yellow.  This scheme is somewhat vague and a fuller specification might 
involve closer attention to different modes of experience, for instance grading empathy would involve 
altogether different considerations to the more simple comparison of height, and colour relations will be 
different again, but I trust I have provided sufficient gist for my point.       
  Given the affinity between dispositions and abilities, these considerations may more directly concern the 












Chapter 3.  The Ability Hypothesis. 
 
  An established tradition inaugurated by Gilbert Ryle (1949) finds a distinction between two different sorts of 
knowledge.  Propositional facts which science targets as knowing that, in contrast to learning an ability which 
involves non-factual knowledge and learning of how.  The Abilities Hypothesis is an objection to the knowledge 
argument which frames Mary first colour experience as learning a new skill or ability by way of practical 
knowledge, rather than a new propositional fact as premised in the knowledge argument.  The hypothesis is 
that Mary’s first experience of colour enables her to recognise, imagine, and judge resemblances of colour.  
(Though this distinction is commonly observed in modern analytical philosophy, it is not universally accepted, 
for example Stanley & Williamson 2001 argue that the former subsumes that latter as a species).  After 
outlining Robinson’s position, I will present David Lewis and Nemirow’s ability hypothesis interspersed with 
arguments from others, and reject the hypothesis while gaining valuable insight about Mary. 
  Robinson detects the ability hypothesis in some way conflating Mary’s having the capacity to see red, with 
Mary having the experience of seeing red.  He would say Mary pre-release was always disposed with the 
capacity which enables her to see red, and in that sense already had the ability simply was not exercised 
before leaving the room.  Robinson provides some historical context, explaining that Ryle’s behaviourism was 
quite obscure regarding the analysis of sensations (p.37), but he never aimed to establish dispositionalism so 
generally as to eliminate the aspect of inner subjective experience that I have bracketed as the WIL (final 
reminder, Nagel’s ‘what-its-like’).  The ability hypothesis compliments a functionalist account of mind that 
equates the inner experience event with a disposition, and Robinson argues that it fails.  I will first lay out 
Robinson’s understanding before presenting my take on Lewis. 
  Robinson takes Lewis (2004) as attempting to explain how Mary is relieved of her ignorance of what it is like 
to see colour, and Robinson charges him of mistaking what an ability hypothesis is doing, essentially by 
conflating the ability or capacity to recognise red with her knowing  before she leaves the room what red looks 
like.  Robinson rehearses age-old claims (pp 38-43) to show that Lewis’ functionalism involves a failed attempt 
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to explain away the qualitative aspect of our experience, while an ability account of Mary’s experience must 
feature her having experienced what red looks like, or else her brain would only provide the unexercised 
causal capacity allowing her to discriminate colour – exercised when she first sees it.  Robinson reads Lewis 
(1983) as failing to explain why the phenomenal aspect in itself contributes nothing to the operation of the 
functional state, while at the same time relying on the ‘feel’ for the ability to imagine or “reactivate that same 
state” (p.40).  This ambiguity invites Robinson to charge Lewis with those same objections against topic 
neutrality; because apparently Mary’s functioning results not from properties that she discriminates in qualia, 
but from those physical properties of her brain and environment.  A purely functional account which renders 
WIL as causally impotent renders Mary’s new experience as just an activation of potential mental pathways.  
If Lewis’ account is correct, then a person would not learn any new facts by way of the qualitative aspect of a 
new experience, and that premise in the knowledge argument could be rejected.  Robinson quotes several 
examples of Lewis referring explicitly to first-person sensations within his argument, which are inconsistent 
with his theory and uncovers the incoherence of identifying sensations with functional brain states.    
  Before I take up Lewis, I want to mention an interesting attempt by Phillip Pettit (2004) to merge a 
functionalist analysis of qualia with abilities.  Pettit presents ‘motion-blind’ Mary as not experiencing motion 
while in captivity, achieved with a clever computer-generated strobe light set up to compensate for actual 
movement so that everything appears as though static.  Pettit wants to compare why the visual experiencing 
of motion may not evoke the same intuition as the knowledge argument does with colour, that may help 
explain why our colour-Mary intuition is so strong and mistaken, and show that both Mary’s can know before 
release what their outside experience will be like. 
 Pettit tells us the following: Motion-blind Mary can calculate every position of a moving ball while inside the 
room, and her beliefs based on those calculations remain unchanged when she leaves the room to actually 
see that movement.  Then those beliefs come to serve her functionally disposed brain states which enable 
her to catch the ball.  These same facts about the ball are satisfied by a different belief profile in virtue of 
different causal bases and the only change in her knowledge is a “shift in her perceptual and inferential 
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abilities” (p.116) which we are told is just a new way of knowing those same facts that she knew in the static 
room.  In this way she is just exercising an ability in relation to those facts; using practical know-how from 
what she previously knew only intellectually.   
  Another way Pettit frames the thought experiment has Mary leaving the room to virtually position herself 
within the network of possibilities all grounded in the facts she previously knew about motion (p118).  Pettit 
then presents as a parallel, colour-Mary resituating herself amongst the colour facts like motion Mary did with 
the facts of velocity, angular momentum, and such like.  Pettit’s essay is dense, but his argument seems 
undercut by a difference in the perceived objects which will not support the parallel he draws which depends 
on some equivalent element in each case.  We have no intuitive problem thinking of motion in entirely physical 
terms, or completely described using only physical properties.  The same is not the case for colour which is 
not fully described by physical properties (at least that is our strong intuition); whereas motion can be 
exhaustively specified by location relations against a background datum; colour by hypothesis involves some 
datum bound up in the perceiver.  A different way of illustrating this thought is that while motion Mary’s 
correct beliefs about position and motion inside the room might deductively generate more belief about 
motion for her outside the room, the beliefs which colour-Mary acquires when she exits share no logical 
equivalence with her previous monochrome beliefs.  I might detect how Pettit would resist my undercutting, 
where he claims that if the knowledge argument is to have, “…any point, it has to be assumed that colour is a 
physically analysable property that is detectable by human beings in a physically analysable way; otherwise 
physicalism would be undermined before the argument ever gets going.” (2004, p126).  However, I 
understand the knowledge argument as challenging those physicalist assumptions contained in this sentence, 
not that it need assume them to get off the ground.  Perhaps he means that the knowledge argument intuition 
rides on the disputable idea that colour is essentially an experience which would rule out physicalism by 
definition.   
  The last point might be in play where I detect Pettit and I maybe talking past each other by entering the 
knowledge argument from a different intuitive spring board:  He says something very curious: “…Mary knows 
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all the objectual properties of colour, including the colour of this or that object, since she knows all the physical 
facts,…and all corresponding intentional facts to do with which colour experiences are experiences of which 
colours.” (p.126, my emphasis).  Two related things to say here. Pettit seems to be making the same move 
that Dennett made with the blue banana: conflating scientific knowledge with something approaching 
physical omniscience, because by hypothesis, monochrome-lense-Mary has no way of correlating intentional 
facts with colour experiences.  Even if we allow her a sort of maximal scientific access so that she could 
reference exhaustive mapping of brain states with intentional states in limitless human specimens, she still 
will not know what red looks like.  Secondly, Pettit illicitly includes intentional belief states as physical brain 
states by assuming they can be specified with scientific facts (or identified by exhaustive experiment in 
monochrome), because there is good reason to think that intentional mental events are partly constituted by 
phenomenal states (see, generally, Mendelovici 2018, ch3), and so the knowledge argument intuition arises 
again and around we go. 
  Lewis (1988 in 2004) is clear that having an experience is the best way of learning what that experience is 
like in a way we cannot be told about, but that this tells us nothing about the metaphysics of the mind or how 
science is limited.  He posits the logical possibility of an internal change made to our brains by surgery or magic 
(ala Dennett’s Swamp Mary), which brings about the same brain state that an experience would.  Lewis 
imagines the possibility of a science lesson providing the same result as the surgical intervention, albeit with 
a method we cannot fathom yet.  He mentions the imaginative access we have to new experiences made up 
from elements of old ones, and uses an example of a musician who imagines ‘hearing’ a musical piece from 
reading its score.  His thought introduces what I called ‘imaginative-distance’ in chapter two, because the 
musician is in some way piecing together separate memories involving resemblances previously experienced.  
I said there how I could not begin to comprehend the first step of imagining WIL for Nagel’s bat, and Lewis 
agrees that we cannot imagine potential experiences if they bear no resemblance to past episodes even in 
conjunction with science lessons, but he wonders, “…how new is “new enough?”.” (p265) to render them in 
principle off limits.  
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  He offers a further clarification to help us with Mary by introducing another sort of knowledge distinct from 
knowing that or knowing how:  Knowledge de se.  This kind of knowing essentially involves the bearer of that 
knowledge, with self-involving facts only true for that bearer, which may include information only relevant 
from the bearer’s location in time and space.  I take it that he draws this distinction as a way we might miss 
the point about what Mary learns the first time she sees red; in case we are thinking of it in the sense of a de 
se proposition because logically that state of hers is only achieved when she first experiences red.  Lewis is 
warning us not to be “bewitched” by the first-person perspective (p.269) in conflating Marys de se proposition 
‘I am now seeing green’, with her learning an objective fact about what green looks like.  Perhaps I am because 
bewitched because I am sure not to be conflating the experience referred to as ‘that is what green looks like’ 
with a purported objective fact about green, or with the proposition “I am now seeing green”.   
  Paul (2017) might help clarify what Lewis takes from the de se distinction;  Mary discovers a new perceptual 
truth about seeing green with the experience of seeing green, and that truth could only be learnt with 
experience.  It is the physical fact that she already knew about green seeing brain states, but presented in a 
distinctive experiential way.  This means any number of truths can be grounded in the way green looks, but 
those truths need not be primitive facts about green and hence Mary doesn’t learn a new fact about green, 
but just a new de se truth grounded in facts she already knew.  (This understanding might imply that Robinson 
is thinking of facts as items which can be irreducibly perspectival, and on the face of it we would not expect 
physicalism to be refuted because it does not range over an ontology containing such perspectival facts 
because it offends an inclination to parsimony and simple ontology.  Thinking out loud for now, a dualist 
ontology might be simpler overall if it conceptually packaged that super abundance of perspectival facts in an 
elegant way, but I get ahead of myself.  We will see in future chapters how Robinson comes at parsimony 
from a different perspective).   
  Paul talks about the brain physically realizing the experience that Mary is having, which is different from 
Lewis who identifies the brain state as constituting the experience.  I will investigate throughout chapters six 
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to eight how a physicalist account might explain a realizing relationship and whether it collapses into a Lewis 
style identity, as Robinson argues that it does.  
  Lewis formulates the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information to which he says the knowledge arguments is 
committed: 
“That is the hypothesis that besides physical information there is an irreducibly different kind of 
information to be had: phenomenal information. The two are independent. Two possible cases might 
be exactly alike physically, yet differ phenomenally. When we get physical information we narrow 
down the physical possibilities, and perhaps we narrow them down all the way to one, but we leave 
open a range of phenomenal possibilities. When we have an experience, on the other hand, we acquire 
phenomenal information; possibilities previously open are eliminated; and that is what it is to learn 
what the experience is like.” (1988, p271).  
 
Phenomenal information involves the information an observer receives from the qualia or WIL of an 
experience and is irreducible and independent from physical information, being intrinsic to the experience 
itself, or an aspect or facet of an experience.  Lewis argues that the knowledge argument rides on this notion 
of phenomenal information which is only received in an experience.  If the hypothesis is false and there is no 
phenomenal information, there would still exist WIL to have the experience but no information about it would 
be phenomenal and all information about the experience would be physical, and could be communicated by 
science without undergoing the experience.  Lewis says If we grant the hypothesis then the knowledge 
argument does refute materialism, and while he cannot disprove the hypothesis, he will argue that it is 
unappealing in conjunction with the ability hypothesis which “…does justice to the way experience best 
teaches us what it’s like.” (p275).  I directly quote these few simple words because they succinctly range over 
the crux of the matter, and in a sense they encode for his position because Robinson would say experience is 
what it’s like, and not that experience teaches us what it’s like.  Am I noticing here that either Lewis is tipping 
the scales at the outset or perhaps indicating a different project?  I suppose we need not worry so long as he 
can explain away the projected intuition from the knowledge argument. 
  Lewis continues to interrogate the nature of phenomenal information by raising three different analogies 
(p.278-283) designed to illustrate it’s strange and implausible character, such that a single state of affairs like 
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Mary seeing a red apple, can potentially generate an unlimited amount of phenomenal information, because 
we might think of Mary possibly occupying unlimited new perspectives by seeing the apple under different 
light from different angles and distance.  But Mary would not learn of any new possibility regarding the nature 
of the apple beyond a limited number of observations.  He is driving home the idea that phenomenal 
information is only constrained by endless possible perspectives to be had, yet there is only a single state-of-
affairs informing that endless quantity of information.  Lewis’ intuition is offended by the peculiarity of 
thinking of a potentially endless array of information providing any new knowledge about the apple.  This 
connects to my thought earlier when I wondered if Robinson was committed to a super abundance of 
perspectival facts and how they might fit within either a physical or dualist ontology.   
  Lewis tries a different approach, arguing that the hypothesis of phenomenal information works against the 
dualist intuition as well, because if we posited a science of parapsychology describing all the nonphysical 
causes, laws and properties, Mary could not learn about them in the room.  She must also experience what 
they are like, because phenomenal information is independent of any informative information about the 
world, and not just physical information about the world.  This is a curious challenge, in support of which the 
dualist should expect Lewis to prime the same intuition against parapsychology by saying something about 
the properties it studies and propositions that it generates, which we could then judge against the intuition 
we have about neuroscience and colour vision.  We have a handle on physics enough to prime the intuition 
against physicalism, but no handle at all on the science of parapsychology to do the same.  Lewis’ position so 
far amounts to saying that phenomenal information, if it existed, would potentially ground unlimited 
unactualized experiences, which he finds altogether peculiar enough for him to be sure something is wrong 
with the notion. 
  A different kind of objection-from-peculiarity that Lewis raises in the penultimate section of the paper is 
titled, “From phenomenal to epiphenomenal”. (p.280): phenomenal information is isolated from its supposed 
effects on the world because it is by hypothesis independent of physical information.  His idea is that Mary 
might behave exactly like we expect her to when she leaves the room while seeing green instead of red.  In 
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terms of the phenomenal information at play, the difference between seeing green and seeing red would 
make no physical difference to the effects on her brain.  This is effectively the old famous objection of 
interactionism founded by Princess Elizabeth against Descartes.  The difference with the knowledge argument 
however is that no separate mental stuff is mentioned in the premises, which only concern Mary’s inability to 
access what Lewis is calling phenomenal information from inside the room, so Lewis is somewhat begging the 
question against the knowledge argument, or at least over relying on the hypothesis which he is arguing for.  
He connects this to the related issue of physical causal closure, which is an assumption made in physics that 
every physical event has a complete physical cause, leaving nothing for a non-physical stuff like phenomenal 
information to do.  Betting against physics he says is a bad move, and a much safer bet on phenomenal 
information should consider it epiphenomenal, that is, causally impotent on physical stuff at least.  The causal 
closure argument is a strong one for physicalism, after all physics is very successful.  Robinson will offer 
independent argument for dualism later, but here he simply says that Lewis has no right to object to 
interactionism because he has not offered a physical explanation of Mary being ‘surprised’ by the phenomenal 
information that portrays colour. 
  Lewis presents another argument for epiphenomenalism without leaning on the authority of physics, 
involving apparatus of dependence and independence (pp285-287), which he takes to show the essential 
nature of qualia causing the same physical effect regardless of the colour presented to Mary.  Robinson argues 
(p46) that this objection works equally against Lewis who would accept that numerically different neurons in 
the brain could achieve exactly the same mental event, because an item still has an effect just in case another 
item may have performed the same role.  However it is not clear that Robinson can make this move because 
he requires the character of redness to be mentally distinct from greenness to the extent that it makes a 
different impression on Mary, while Lewis needn’t implicate any distinctive physical properties to the 
individually identical neurons which realise the brain state.  As far as Lewis is committed, any set of neurons 
with the right configuration can do the job, but Robinson requires specific sorts of phenomenal information 
to entertain Mary with different colours.  
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  Lewis finally comes to the actual ability hypothesis by quoting a summary from Laurence Nemirov (1980, 
p.475-6).  Although Lewis and Nemirov certainly unsettle the notion that there is a subjective fact denoted by 
‘what it’s like to see red’, they do not refute the idea of phenomenal information.  After next rounding out 
our reading of Lewis, I will jump to a much-updated defence of the ability hypothesis from Nemirov (2007), 
which is not mentioned by Robinson. 
  Lewis ends his paper with further mention of the de se distinction, which I understand to mean Mary  
only comes to learn perspectival truths related to the truth that she has experienced seeing red, such as she 
can remember seeing red and she can visualise or imagine red, and recognise an experience of seeing red.  I 
do not see this helping us describe Mary's situation; there is something special about the experience of colour 
phenomena, that while enabling imagination, memory, and judgements of resemblance, is not captured by 
de se truth.  It will be surprising for the man spilling salt all around the shop when after following the trail he 
comes to realise it is himself who is spilling the salt, and that new item of knowledge was all that was missing 
about a drama he could know everything else about.  In attempt to reduce any inclination to being fooled by 
the ambiguity of the term knowledge as Lewis warns against (p.289), I will frame the comparison with the 
looser term of ‘awareness’: seeing colour for the first time is not much similar to the messy shopper, because 
the item that enters awareness is the raw feel of the experience, not just the knowledge of self-involvement 
in an otherwise fully understood situation.   
   I will interject my resistance to Lewis with a paragraph now defending him from an objection by Rosenthal 
(2019, p.40), who points out that Mary’s first experience might not provide any ability for recognising or 
imagining red because she may not afterwards remember anything about its character, and so she cannot be 
said to have acquired any of Lewis’ cited abilities from the experience.  Rosenthal may be setting the bar too 
high, because it is not unusual to forget an ability and cease to enjoy a skill while retaining the disposition 
acquired to support that ability or part of the disposition which is why riding a bike is much easier after a five 
years break than when first getting on as a child.  Lewis could think of the disposition in terms of a functional 
brain structure that would activate for an occurrence of the ability when it was exercised in the future when 
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seeing red, while not being available from voluntary memory.  If we consider a similar weakness for 
remembering propositional knowledge, for example knowing the capital of Australia but struggling to 
remember with ‘Canberra’ on the tip of the tongue, and then once prompted, ‘It was there all along in the 
back of my mind’.  This would plausibly be counted as knowing Sydney as the capital.   
  Michael Tye (2000) maintains that physicalism has a satisfactory response to the knowledge argument, but 
that the ability hypothesis is not part of it.  His argument involves the specificity that operates with perception, 
in relation to the much cruder specificity for remembering and naming experiences.  Apparently, humans can 
differentiate 10 million colours by sight, but we can only store representations and names for a small 
proportion, because our brains are simply not equipped to remember that amount.  As apparatus for Tye’s 
setup, let us index and label red1 all the way through to red10 000 000 for a computer to generate any shade 
on demand.   While we can perceive a difference between red19 and red21, we cannot represent the 
difference in memory and tag those different representations with different concepts.  We must bring colour 
samples to the shop to match up different furnishings rather than judging from memory, because we 
understand the concept red, but cannot determine specific shades because we lack the recognitional 
concepts.  In this way we cannot judge colours with the specificity that we can experience colours.  He points 
out that this disability to conceptualise from experience to memory is also relevant for sounds and shapes, 
whereby we can experience fine discriminations that we have no concept for, such as an inkblot whose shape 
we can see but for which we have no concept. 
  Tye agrees with Lewis and Nemirow that Mary acquires the ability to recognise and remember red once she 
has her first experience, but that she knows more than that while she is looking at red which cannot be 
characterised as an acquired ability.  She knows what it is like to see that shade of red17, without knowing 
that it is named “red17”.  Then it is true to say that she knows what red17 looks like even if she only knows it 
indexically from her perspective as that red I am now looking at.  Tye asks, exactly what ability is Mary 
learning?  Because she will not reliably be able to identify other items outside he field of vision or on other 
occasions as red17 as distinct from red18 or 19, nor can she imagine red17 with correct specificity.  So, while 
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she does not gain those abilities, it would be queer indeed to suggest Mary does not know what red17 looks 
like while she is looking at it.  It is that aspect of knowing which Tye uses to conclude against the ability 
hypothesis as a general account of Mary’s knowing WIL.  Allot might hinge on Tye’s use of ‘reliability’, 
regarding Mary’s remembering red17, for it to qualify as an ability or not, because sometimes she correctly 
points out a match.  I pointed out earlier with reference to Rosenthal (2019), that often-times we cannot 
remember simple propositional facts like the capital of Australia, but upon prompting, we ‘knew it all along’.  
There may be scope to disagree with Tye on the finer points (for example we might credit Mary with an 
unreliable ability if she sometimes recognised red17 correctly), but I am persuaded that the ability hypothesis 
does not manage elements of WIL such as red17 or the shape of a cloud or an inkblot, because possible 
varieties of experience outrun our capacity to remember or imagine them, while also presenting Mary with 
something to know of what it’s like. 
  Nemirow (2007) refers to Tye’s challenge as, “Objection from Knowing With Particularity in The Moment.” 
(p.35).  Curiously, Nemirow spends a page emphasising that Mary must have the ability to recognise and 
imagine red17 in comparison to red19 while they are both in her field of vision (she may manipulate the colour 
in her mind’s eye by altering its shape perhaps, and his argument isn’t dependent on how good Mary’s 
imagination is which I assume naturally varies amongst people).  He tells us that Tye is mistaken in denying 
Mary those Lewis abilities while she is looking at red17, but Tye does not make that charge!  Nemirow also 
accepts that Mary’s ability to remember may quickly lapse as soon as she closes her eyes.  Nemirow proposes 
that Mary’s knowledge of what it’s like to see red is a kind of second order perceptual awareness:  
“Arguably, at the first moment when Mary sees red17 she cannot remember having done so.  
However, the conscious awareness necessary for Mary to know what it is like to see red17 requires 
that Mary be able reflect on her experience, which she could do only in a moment after the first 
moment that she sees red17.”  (2007, p51, fn8). 
 
This would mean that Mary doesn’t know what it’s like to see red until she has consciously reflected on the 
experience, which for Rosenthal coincides with her acquiring the ability to remember that first moment of 
being presented with red.  This generally implies that we do not know what any experience is like until after 
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a moment’s reflection, which is at best a questionable matter of psychology, and far too convenient for 
Nemirow.  If I understand him correctly, there is no such concept as red17 to be had by a captivated Mary 
until she can reflect on the previous moment, and at that point she acquires the recognitional ability to 
represent red17.  Even if we go along with Nemirow, I can reintroduce Tye’s objection, and cite the qualia 
which is the specific hue of red17 as constituting what appears to Mary, and as the perceptual grounding of 
the concept red17.  This reading of the hue itself as a conceptually empty item will likely inform how we might 
categorise that appearance in terms of knowledge, so that while it may not rise to the status of a fact in 
support of the knowledge argument, it will serve to defeat Nemirow’s argument.  Mary must see that hue and 
experience what it is like before it is cognitively taken up into a recognitional ability. 
  Nemirov presents another variation of this theme to argue further for the ability hypothesis, which coheres 
with my previous analysis:  Mary is distracted while looking at red17, and while in that distracted state she 
does not know what it is like to see red17 because she is not presently looking at it.  While distracted she can 
neither recognise (reliably I concede for argument sake) another sample of red17, or distinguish that sample 
from red16 or 18, and neither can she remember how to imagine red17.  Granting Marys disability for the 
sake of Nemirov’s argument, he concludes that while distracted she does not know what is like to see red17, 
and the ability hypothesis correctly predicts that Marys knowledge of what it is like to see red17 is only 
transitive while she is looking at it.  Even if we grant all that, Mary can still be said to learn WIL to see the visual 
hue corresponding to red17 upon first sight, which is all the knowledge argument requires.  He tells us that 
Tye uses this example, “…to show that knowledge of what it's like to see red17 cannot be identified with the 
ability to mentally point to an experience indexically, since Mary has this ability in her distracted state but 
lacks knowledge of what the experience is like.” (2007, p51, fn9).  Tye maybe taken to be pointing out that 
Mary’s imaginative ability extends to mentally pointing indexically (from the inside as it were, at the hue which 
corresponds with red17), while at the same time she might not know that ‘red17’ looks like that.  This way of 
parsing the situation also separates the recognitional concept red17 with the hue which appears to Mary, 
which seems enough to defeat the ability hypothesis while not establishing that Mary is learning a new fact.     
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  I am not exorcised of the ‘first-person bewitchment’ which Lewis accuses me of.  I do however gain some 
valuable insight from his distinctions for understanding the knowledge argument:  Along with ability and 
information, he says acquaintance must be added to the pot (p.289).  I believe Physicalism might better 
account for what Mary lacks inside the room with the notion of acquaintance, which I will broach in chapter 
five. 
 
Chapter 4.   (note on) Frank Jackson’s revised position.  
 
  Frank Jackson changed his mind from the original position he held when he first presented the knowledge 
argument.  This was one of the, “…more remarkable turnarounds in contemporary philosophy.”   (Stoljar & 
Nagasawa, 2004, p.35).  Jackson bites the bullet that Lewis fires in the last chapter and takes qualia to be 
epiphenomenal and unable to cause knowledge (1995).  Jackson argues (2003, 2007) that the best physicalist 
account of qualia is a representationalist theory that frames Mary leaving the room and perceiving red as her 
being only aware of representational content within her experience and not of any intrinsic quality of redness 
in the world.  There is a common-sense requirement that Jackson must make good on the claim that redness 
does not really exist, and which prompts me to treat the position as low hanging fruit which I have chosen to 
delete from the dissertation to make way for prima facie more plausible and promising positions.  There 
obviously must be some merit to Jackson’s revised position but I must cull what I judge to be the least valuable 
or important elements of Robinsons treatment for the dissertation space I have.  On the basis that Jackson’s 
revised position is the least attractive approach to the knowledge argument in the literature, and mindful that 
‘Representationalism’ would tie us up in broader complications without clear resources of its own to help with 
the knowledge argument (see Alter 2007, p72), I will take aim at other physicalist approaches.  The 




Chapter 5.   The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. 
 
 
  The ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ (PCS) was first named by Daniel Stoljar (2005) to indicate a distinctive 
sort of physicalist response to anti-physicalist arguments.  I consider Robinson’s rejection of the PCS a sort of 
meta-objection because the strategy is usually targeted at other anti-physicalist arguments outlined in the 
introduction, rather than the knowledge argument itself.  Issues which the strategy involve are technical and 
esoteric and would require a full dissertation for anywhere near a sufficient treatment, but I will try and 
provide a flavour of the strategy in relation to Robinson's objections and the knowledge argument. 
  A phenomenal concept is a technical term for a special sort of concept that allow us to think about our 
phenomenal conscious states.  These concepts concern phenomenal states from the direct or inner 
perspective as exemplified in the mind of the person deploying the phenomenal concept when introspecting 
or ‘in conversation with herself’ thinking about qualia or aspects of qualia to which she is paying attention. 
The PCS situates phenomenal concepts in an explanation of what Mary is missing before she exits the room, 
whereby she is ignorant of a phenomenal concept for the colour red, and not any physical fact about the red 
which she already knows.  Different philosophers have proposed various accounts of phenomenal concepts 
all intended to frame qualia in this physicalist friendly conceptual way.  Loar (1990, 1997) appears to be the 
forerunner of this approach, developed in various ways by amongst others Carruthers (2000), David Chalmers 
(2006),  Levin (2007), David Pappineu (2002, 2007) and Katelin Balog (2012b).  
  Physicalists think that these phenomenal concepts are special or unique compared to other sorts of concepts.  
One way they are unique is by isolation from physical concepts which pick out the same referent, in that the 
phenomenal concept cannot be inferred from physical concepts, and this isolation supposedly is what partly 
makes the physical-phenomenal identity counter intuitive.  They are also supposed to be unique by their 
process of acquisition which requires the experience of the referent that they are about, and they also inform 
us to some extent of what those conscious states are in themselves (compared to normal concepts which are 
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always about something else).  The existence and nature of phenomenal concepts is disputed and getting a 
handle on exactly what they are and how they are supposed to work is difficult, as is understanding how they 
are supposed to help us understand the identity of phenomenal qualities with brain states.   
  It may help students of philosophy begin to get the notion of phenomenal concepts in view by hearing that 
Wittgenstein would not accept their existence, because there can be no intersubjective checks on their 
meaning or reference, and so his private language argument would render them nonsense.  I will not be 
directly considering this behaviourist type position. 
  Brian Loar is usually considered the first to articulate the PCS.  Loar focuses on the distinction between 
concepts and properties.  While anti-physicalists he says often rely on an intuition about phenomenal 
concepts which “…are conceptually irreducible in this sense: they neither a priori imply, nor are implied by, 
physical-functional concepts.” (1997, p.597).  Loar says the anti-physicalist extends this intuition to conclude 
that phenomenal qualities cannot be identified with physical-functional properties, but that no sound 
philosophical argument has yet appeared to support that.  Loar (like most everybody else) feels this intuition, 
and proposes that the PCS, “…may provide some relief, or at least some distance, from the illusory 
metaphysical intuition.” (1997, p.598).   
  I will interrogate Robinsons rejection of the PCS and probe those theories he mentions to an extent for 
judging his rejection.1  Robinson claims the PCS is wrong headed in targeting how we can know or think a 
concept rather than how there could be a phenomenal property different from a property exemplified in the 
brain.  Balog says, “…epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal 
concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties.  Phenomenal concepts involve 
unique cognitive mechanisms, [which can be] physically implemented.” (2012, p.1).  Robinson’s consideration 
of the PCS keeps returning to the charge that it confuses conceptual irreducibility with property irreducibility 
so that conceptualising from phenomenal properties is supposed to generate distinctive physical-functional 
properties.  Robinson’s core claim is that physicalists do not explain how this goes.  
 
1 There are numerous theories which fall under the PCS.  I will only engage those mentioned by Robinson (which does seem to 
be a fair representation of those most cited in the literature). 
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  Before Brian Loar, phenomenal concepts had only been used by dualists to point at private first-person 
aspects of experience, or what we now call qualia.  Then physicalists began using them in the context of the 
PCS: 
“The strategy, as most generally expounded, consists in some way of claiming that phenomenal 
concepts contain the experience within themselves; generally this is conceived on the model of 
indexical’s or of quotation.  The result is meant to be that the ‘explanatory gap’ and all that goes with 
it, cease to be challenges to physicalism once one realises that these things are merely the by-products 
of the difference between physical and phenomenal concepts, and not a difference between public 
and private properties…”  (Robinson 2016, p.75). 
 
If phenomenal concepts do not acquire their content from the qualia which they designate, physicalists must 
explain from whence the content is derived.  Robinson thinks that the quotational-indexical model of the PCS2 
specifically mimics dualism in a way which mirrors Russell’s semantic of logically proper names whereby the 
qualia itself (‘sense-datum’ in Russell) features in a proposition.  In this sense he judges the PCS as offering no 
innovation, but simply as claiming for physicalism, semantic features designed to refer to qualia.  Physicalists 
he insists must account for this ‘semantic transfer problem’ and explain how qualia relate to physical 
properties, or at a minimum tell us how the PCS illuminates these two things.  Robinson setting the stalls out 
like this may be tendentious, in that neither Russell nor anybody else have settled a theoretical status for 
qualia which would inform a thorough going semantics.  That said, it is a fairly straight forward act to pick out 
qualia without committing to what they really are, so I will take the semantic transfer problem as a prompt to 
alert illegitimate uses of qualia terms by the physicalist. 
  Up to now in this dissertation I have resisted using the phrase ‘hard problem’, because I could avoid it with 
distinctions I have made and because it is sometimes abused in popular writing, but Robinson makes essential 
use of it here in his argument.  The ‘hard problem’ was coined by David Chalmers: 
 “…a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel - an associated quality of experience.  
These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short.  The problem of 
explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness.  This is the 
really hard part of the mind-body problem.” (1996, p.4) 
 
2 There are numerous approaches within the PCS.  The ‘quotational’ approach originated by Papineau seems to receive most 




The problem is that the properties science ascribes to the brain and the qualitative properties which the brain 
enables us to experience seem entirely different.  Robinson objection centres around Leibniz’s Law which says 
it is impossible for items with different properties to be identical, and he charges that the PCS must cope with 
Leibniz Law while accounting for the semantic transfer problem.  Robinson objects that the PCS seems actually 
a retrograde step for physicalism because older theories like functionalism and topic neutral analysis which I 
discussed in earlier chapters were direct attempts to answer the hard problem because they take phenomenal 
data not to be the transparent presentation of phenomenal qualities like they intuitively seem to be, and in 
this way they claim not to violate Leibniz Law.  Although those older theories fail, he says it can be seen how 
they are at least attempts to solve the hard problem, while in contrast it isn’t clear how the PCS is even meant 
to address the hard problem, “…how does the fact that phenomenal concepts are in some sense 
discontinuous with physical concepts show how a physical state can manifest itself (or seem to do so) as a 
phenomenal quality?” (p.78).  Robinson anticipates four options that the PCS could take (pp.79-91) and 
roughly aligns different physicalist attempts amongst them.  Instead of assessing the four options he lays out 
for the physicalist, a more comprehensive way of considering Robinsons objection is prompted by a footnote 
concerning a paper by Balog (2012a), in which she lists eight desiderata of phenomenal concepts in the 
context of the traditional puzzles about consciousness.  Robinson complains that none of her formulations 
confront Leibniz Law, and so they do not do, “…justice to the hard problem, neat, so to speak.” (p92, fn1).  
Much will fall on how we interpret the hard problem.  Balog (2012, p6) sees the puzzles as mostly epistemic 
in nature for physicalists to nominate qualia as appearance properties and not essential properties, and so 
not offending Leibniz’s Law.  
  Robinson frames the PCS as confusing a de dicto problem with a de re problem and puts a question in Marys 
mouth, “how can that property that I am now experiencing be the same property as one of that set I already 
knew about from science?” (p.81-82).   He insists that the real problem is only in focus from the first-person 
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perspective and presents the following argument along these lines (p.89), which I will claim over generalises.  
The first lines I paraphrase:    
Call the set of physical facts P.    
Call Mary's scientific mode of access to those facts S.   
Call the experiential mode of access which she lacks in the room H.   
 
“If we regard S and H as external to P, then the addition of new mode of access will not alter P.  But 
the physicalist hypothesis is that everything relevant is included in P: modes of access to physical facts 
are themselves simply physical processes and are included in physical facts.  Therefore, if [Mary] knows 
all the relevant members of P, [she] should know all the facts about H, including the fact of what that 
mode of access is phenomenally alike.” (p90. Emphasis is mine).   
 
In effect this seems like a stronger version of Jacksons knowledge argument because it makes explicit a 
questionable connection between modes of access and physical facts.  Making the connection explicit in this 
way prompts my objection.  While I accept that a new mode of access to P will not alter P, it is a curious claim 
that modes of access to facts, being physical processes, are included in the physical facts.  Leaving H open 
ended or without a rationale as to what is included in H, places an implausible requirement on P as follows.  
An echolocating bat enjoys a mode of access to P, and while Mary could be fully informed on the entire 
workings of echolocation, we wouldn’t expect her access to P through S to underwrite her access to what it is 
like for the bat, not least because that would be impossible for Mary but relatedly because it would be a 
bizarre requirement on physicalism that S must include all facts pertaining to what all phenomenological 
perspectives are like.  A weaker objection also works because he does not limit the experiential perspectives 
feasible for Mary.  How are we to understand what he includes in H?  We experience different phenomenology 
when viewing a picture from different angles, and it is unclear how that fact (if it were a fact) could be included 
in H.  Robinson would push back and place the onus on the physicalist to specify why S does not range over P 
while including H (if physicalism is the thesis that all facts are physical facts).  The phenomenal concept 
strategy involves proposals that Mary is ignorant of concepts and not facts. 
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  My objection to Robinson is related to a weakness in other anti-physicalist arguments noticed by Sundstrum 
(pp272-74, 2011).  PCS Physicalists accept that there is something right about the intuition that what appears 
to consciousness is how reality really is.  Sundstrum quotes philosophers saying that we may use phenomenal 
concepts to pick out phenomenal properties by ‘directly and essentially’ referring to them (Loar), or by 
‘providing a grasp of phenomenal properties that reveals their essence’ (Balog).  Horgan and Tienson interpret 
those phrasings to license the following argument: 
 
“1.  When a phenomenal property is conceived under a phenomenal concept, this property is 
conceived otherwise than as a physical-functional property.     
2.    When a phenomenal property is conceived under a phenomenal concept, this property is 
conceived directly, as it is in itself. 
3.    If (i) a property P is conceived, under a concept C, otherwise than as a physical functional property, 
and (ii) P is conceived, under C, as it is in itself, then P is not a physical-functional property. 
Hence, 
4. Phenomenal properties are not physical-functional properties.”  
(Sundstrum 2011, p272, quoting Horgan and Tienson 2001, sect. 3). 
 
Sundstrum argues that the argument over extends what the likes of Loar and Balog are committing to by their 
phrasing about phenomenal concepts ‘picking out the essences of properties’, and that those PCS 
philosophers have in mind more nuanced understanding about how phenomenal concepts may reveal 
essences to the extent which blocks this argument.  Sundstrum quotes Loar claiming that his model of direct 
reference involves, “directly rigidly designate” (Loar 1997, p603), and Balog explaining that her quotational 
approach employs phenomenal concepts in a way that, “will not afford any clue as to the fundamental nature 
of the referent. While they ‘afford an insight into the essence of the referent’, the sense in which they do so 
is ‘by exemplification’; i.e. in the sense that phenomenal concepts use phenomenal properties to think about 
phenomenal properties” (Balog 2012, sect. 2). 
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Sundstrum shows by example how we can controversially refer directly or rigidly or by exemplification to 
phenomenal properties without meaning we have an insight into the essential nature of the referent.  I will 
use my own example of a tambourine musical instrument for his explanation, which I hold in the air asking 
friends to observe while I look away.  Sundstrum says this example will show the extent to which PCS theorists 
may mean that we can refer directly or rigidly or by exemplification without knowing essential properties of 
the thing.  Me saying, ‘look at the shape of this instrument’, without necessarily understanding that an 
essential property of that shape is the ratio of its radius to its circumference, and so legitimately excluding 
that essential property from my concept, so Horgan and Tienson’s argument is shown to demand too much 
and fail. 
  Before I move to consider the PCS theories directly, I will table another concern of Robinson which in one 
way or another we will see motivates his resistance to the PCS.  He outlines what he calls the doctrine of ‘weak 
transparency’ which he claims must be true (2016, p.83-85):  ‘Weak transparency’ is the doctrine that we 
must be correct in attributing some central features of our phenomenal experience of the world to our 
common sense concept of the world.  Those phenomenal features are not required to be actual features of 
the world, “only that they purport to be and are features of our naïve or manifest image conception of the 
world.” (p.83).  Although this doctrine may be some-what vague, in some sense it must be true, although 
working out the details is fraught with difficulty as we find at least since John Locke presented the concept of 
primary and secondary qualities. 
  Robinson concedes that he does not understand the utility of phenomenal concepts for the physicalist.  His 
rejection of the leading two contending styles of account as I said at the beginning amounts to a somewhat 
‘meta-level’ rejection which does not engage the theories on their own terms.3  Before I scrutinise those 
accounts in more detail than Robinson does, it will be helpful to mention the basic differences of approach.  
Loar (1997) and Levin (2007) propose recognitional phenomenal concepts.  These concepts are possessed 
 
3 A variety of structural features are used to characterise and specify phenomenal concepts.  I will only be concerned with the 
two varieties singled out by Robinson, which appear between them to receive the most attention in the literature.  For a recent 




partly by being able to recognise phenomenal experiences that are of a kind.  The other approach employs 
‘quotational’ concepts as proposed by Papineau and Balog which are deployed when using something of the 
actual conscious state which is present to the mind.  Loar’s original idea in (1990/97) was that phenomenal 
concepts are direct recognitional concepts in the sense that a person can directly refer to an experience 
because the concepts way of presenting itself involves the actual experience, and that the experience does 
not fix a reference but puts the subject in causal contact with the referent.  The recognition of a qualia triggers 
a recognitional concept such as ‘that red’, which the subject can deploy upon future experiences of that red 
in the future.  The subject thereby has acquired a recognitional concept by a demonstration occurring in the 
mind of 'that redness'.  Such a recognitional concept is called a recognitional phenomenal concept. 
  Balog (2018) understands the field of research since Loar as generally composed along these two lines: the 
recognitional style account of Loar and Levin which emphasise direct reference and hence the conceptual role 
of phenomenal concepts, and the quotational style account of Papineau that we will come to, which develops 
that aspect of phenomenal concepts as somehow featuring the experience itself.   
  Robinson credits Brian Loar (1997) as the innovator of the PCS, and I have chosen to consider Loar’s more 
developed account from his more recent 2003 article which focuses on anti-physicalist arguments prompted 
by Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity” (1980).  Loar thinks a certain reply to Kripke will allow the physicalist to 
accommodate the explanatory gap, because at bottom he diagnoses a conceptual issue grounding that gap, 
and not a property issue.  I am mindful that Robinson considers the explanatory gap per se, to miss the crux 
of Mary’s situation, however Loar is explicitly concerned with the status of properties “non-epistemically 
conceived” (2003, p.113), so let us try and glean any connection to the hard problem as Robinson has 
presented it. 
  Loar conveniently presents the question in conformance with Robinson’s objection: does a phenomenal 
concept relate to a property, such that having the concept implies knowing the essence of the property?  
Kripke (1980) sets up the problem for Loar by showing that we directly refer to token sensations as we 
experience them, so that the way we designate those sensations means they could not be anything other than 
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that sensation.  This seems to block a posteriori identification of that conscious state with a physical brain 
state, in contrast to run of the mill scientific identifications such as our coming to learn that water is H2O.  The 
difference between referring to the sensation (which seems impossible that we discover a posteriori that it is 
a brain state, because we are so intimately acquainted with that pain, no explanation could override that 
identification) and water (which we in principle could accept an explanation that identified those transparent 
and fluid appearance properties with H2O because we might readily understand how H2O constituted those 
appearance properties) is called the ‘explanatory gap’.  That explanatory gap makes Mary’s reference to 
redness seems necessarily to block a posteriori identification with a physical-functional brain state.   Loar tells 
us that the physicalist who is a realist about properties should not suppose, “…that properties are individuated 
epi-stemically; …So the question is this: how might we explain the a posteriori status of a psychophysical 
property identity other than by supposing either that properties are epistemically constituted or that we 
directly grasp the essence of qualia?” (Loar 2003, p.5).  Loar thinks the physicalist has to explain either why 
mind brain identity statements are special in the sense that references to sensations express contingent 
identity with brain states, or else explain how can the reference to sensation be connected a posteriori to 
some neural assembly without expressing different properties.  His proposal of recognitional phenomenal 
concepts is an attempt to build such an explanation. 
  Loar conjectures that psychological items could be hard wired in a way that supports concept relations which 
only appear to identify different properties, because those physical neural connections underlying them do 
not provide a cognitive connection (pp.116-7).  At first blush this might seem to threaten Robinson’s doctrine 
of transparency (2016, Ch 5, sec 6), which I accepted as a rough datum for the dispute (keeping in mind the 
possible complication of primary and secondary qualities) because all sides accept that the qualities we 
perceive are in some sense qualities of the stuff in the world and are not just as it were ‘in our heads’.  Loar 
then characterises how phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts (rather than descriptive or logical 
concepts), in featuring the phenomenal state itself.   
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  I will try and give a flavour of Loar’s technical proposal (2003) for our purposes.  A phenomenal concept 
includes qualia aspects, from visual percepts ‘taken-up’ into psychological roles, perhaps in the form of 
phenomenal memories or vague ‘patterns’ enabling re-identification in the future.  Loar specifies how 
phenomenal concepts are directly referenced, which I will quote because the general plausibility of the whole 
PCS is implicated: 
 
“…phenomenal concepts are not descriptive concepts; they do not have the form "the property I 
hereby ostend" or the like. It is tempting to say that a phenomenal concept picks out its reference, a 
certain quale, directly. This notion "directly" is not the weak one used in causal theories of reference. 
On that use a visual demonstrative concept of a tree refers directly if it does not do so by way of a 
classical Fregean sense or a descriptive condition. That visual demonstrative is mediated by a visual 
experience that can itself be reflectively attended to, even though the concept does not refer to it. 
And that visual experience is quite distinct from the tree. Now a phenomenal concept intuitively 
conceives of its reference without any such distinct intervening factor. It is moreover somewhat 
tempting to think that in exercising the concept one, as it were, grasps the essence of the property it 
picks out. But these are distinct thoughts. That phenomenal concepts are phenomenally direct does 
not entail such a grasp of essence. I see no reason why physicalists should deny the former, while they 
will deny the latter if grasping is meant to be, as it were, revelatory.” (2003, p119). 
 
  Loar proposes that the recognitional act of referencing token experiences of a specific shade of blue must 
be grounded in a less specific disposition to recognise course-grained blueness (because though we can 
experience a thousand shades of blue, we cannot reidentify them).  This disposition enables the deployment 
of a type-demonstrative phenomenal concept of course grained blue, but not token-demonstrative 
phenomenal concepts of each shade of blue. Loar claims an upshot from this is that because those proposed 
essential properties of each shade of blue cannot be mapped one for one with phenomenal concepts, then 
the dualist who thinks “acquaintance” (Ibid p.119) with the essence of a token experienced specific blue, 
cannot think she thereby is acquainted with the essence of generic blue, and therefore she ought to regard 
the disposition to re-identify course grained blue as crucial to deploying the phenomenal concept, and 
therefore the phenomenal concept cannot not be taken to be a direct presentation of essence. 
  Loar argues that if anti-physicalist arguments cannot be formulated without phenomenal concepts as 
connected in some sense one to one with essential properties, then there is nothing for the physicalist to 
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respond to.  Loar says for all we can know, when we refer to a sensation, we are directly referring to that 
neural assembly which implements the phenomenal concept, however:  
“The appeal to recognitional concepts that pick out, say, neural properties is not intended to sidestep 
qualia. That would hardly count as a defence of psychophysical identities.  Physicalism is the thesis 
that, however odd it may seem, that quale (which I am now conceiving phenomenally) might, for all 
we know, be a physical-functional property.” (p.121).   
 
  This may license a description of Mary leaving the room to have a new experience that does not amount to 
her learning a new proposition of the sort “that is what it is like to see red17”, where ‘that’ is functioning in 
the way it does for a proposition, because she can hardly know a property if she cannot determinately 
reference it. 
  Robinson’s stance on the hard problem is that our acquaintance with properties in experience, or our 
epistemic relation to that experience is such an intimate connection that it cannot be explained by epistemic 
relations to anything else, whether directly referenced or not.  This is to object that Loar cannot appeal to 
phenomenal memories or vague phenomenal patterns in the construction of physical phenomenal concepts 
because he is illegitimately using acquaintance properties (or properties not sufficiently different from 
acquaintance properties) where it is impossible that such properties could be in the brain and so cannot be 
used in constructive materialist accounts.  Joseph Levine calls this the ‘materialist constraint’ on physicalist 
accounts of phenomenal properties, “that no appeal be made in the explanation to any mental property or 
relation that is basic.” (2018).  In the rest of this chapter I will firstly consider what Levin (2007) adds to Loar’s 
recognitional account, before turning to Papineau’s quotational account (2007), appended by Balog (2012), 
and then a different type of potentially undercutting objection from Pitt (2019). 
  Janet Levin (2007) aims to bolster Loar’s account by proposing the functional characteristics of those 
recognitional concepts and which help frame how they might fit into Mary’s epistemology.  Loar characterised 
phenomenal concepts as directly denoting referents without mediation by a mode of presentation, and Levin 
adds that phenomenal concepts denote the neural properties which are causally implicated in our use of 
those phenomenal concepts for introspective tasks, which can be either token or type phenomenal concepts.  
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Token concepts are used for first person pointing at a token instance of an aspect of qualia, and they denote 
like a token-demonstrative concept. So the particular neural configuration which, “causes me to make 
introspective note of some experience I'm now having counts as the denotation of the token demonstrative 
“that (experience I'm having now)”.”(2007, p.88).  Although these token-demonstrative concepts can feature 
in our introspective knowledge, we may not remember them well enough to pick out the same aspect of 
experience in future.  They only pick out, “instances of experiences with phenomenal properties, and not 
those properties themselves.” (p.89).  Levin says type phenomenal concepts are more useful against anti-
physicalist arguments because they may pick out: 
“(“that kind [of experience]”), which purport to pick out kinds or properties of experiences from an 
introspective perspective.  The denotation of a phenomenal type‐demonstrative will be the property—
presumably physical—that's causally responsible for the application of that concept in the 
introspective recognition or reidentification of an experience as “that (kind) again” (p.89)   
 
“…If we manage, fairly consistently, to pick out the same physical property when noting, “Oh, that 
(twinge) again” or writing “S” in our diary, then our phenomenal type‐demonstrative denotes that 
property. If there aren't such physical properties, of course, we're stuck with either dualism or 
eliminativism.” (fn5). 
 
The reference of type-demonstrative concepts are achieved through the, “causal and dispositional relations 
an individual has to her internal states that are effected by an introspective “pointing in”; that is, by the fact 
that she's in causal contact with a certain property and is disposed to reidentify it on subsequent occasions.” 
(p.89).  So, the difference between a type and token concept is that the former express repeatably 
recognizable phenomenal properties, while the token expresses particular experiences that have those 
phenomenal properties.  But why couldn’t the subject attend to that phenomenal property within the token 
experience? Because, Levin tells us, the subject cannot determinately reference that property if she lacks the 
ability to recognise it, and the only ‘physicalistically acceptable’ way to confirm  that ability is to test her 
disposition to identify other instances of that property.   
  The difference between non-phenomenal type-demonstratives like “that (kind of) dog over there” and 
phenomenal type demonstratives is that the latter can only be acquired by introspective attention.  Levin tells 
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us that the phenomenal and non-phenomenal type-demonstrative concepts share the following features:  
their referent essentially involves the perspective of the demonstrator, and it is direct, that is without 
identifying a mode of presentation.  These features of phenomenal concepts are taken by physicalists to make 
them non-equivalent to physical or functional properties and so Mary’s new experience is not of irreducible 
phenomenal properties, but rather a new way of conceptualizing what she already knew under physical-
functional description. 
  I understand how Levin’s account might be seen to model how phenomenal experience is processed by the 
brain, which may be the start of intuiting how Mary’s experience of seeing red is identical with the activation 
of a physical-functional configuration that she already knew about under a different description.  Levin is 
effectively modelling causal nodes involved by the brain in representing the world whereby, “phenomenal 
concepts are not supposed to characterise  phenomenal properties at all”(2007, p105), which attracts 
Robinson’s charge that the Levin’s account effectively collapses back to Armstrong’s topic neutral account: “if 
normal experience gives us topic neutral knowledge of our inner workings and Mary already has topic specific 
knowledge, then she already knew more before she had colour experience than can be acquired by having 
it.” (2016, p89).  Robinsons diagnosis here might be challenged.  His idea seems to imply that the physical 
description under which Mary already knew about the neural property is objectively exhaustive, and it will 
therefore be more specific than the knowledge she can acquire with the phenomenal concept, and 
consequently we are left with no explanation of how the further (topic neutral) knowledge from the 
phenomenal concept can be new.  It seems Robinson is implying again that scientific facts and description 
must exhaust all perspectival knowledge.  Physicalism only requires that phenomenal truths supervene on 
physical truths, not that Mary will know all phenomenal truths because she knows all the physical facts.  This 
will be explored in the coming chapters.  
  Something like Robinson’s doctrine of weak transparency (2016, p.83-84) must be true or else we lose 
connection to the world in a way which positions the functional  aspect of Levin’s account as a ‘just-so-story’, 
which could be substituted for any causal model in the background without featuring our phenomenal sense 
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of the world at all.  ‘Weak transparency’ is the doctrine that we must be correct in attributing some central 
features of our phenomenal experience of the world to our common sense concept of the world.  Those 
phenomenal features are not required to be actual features of the world, “only that they purport to be and 
are features of our naïve or manifest image conception of the world.” (p.83).  Although this doctrine is left 
some-what vague (primary and secondary qualities?), it is clear enough to render Levin’s account opaque as 
an explanatory account of Mary’s experience in relation to her neural causal processes in terms Chalmers 
hard problem and with reference to Levine’s materialist constraint cited earlier.  For these reasons I can 
empathise with why Robinson might feel justified in his meta rejection of the PCS without engaging the 
intricacies of those theories to even the basic level which I attempt. 
  Now to Papineau (2002, 2007), who calls his approach a ‘quotational’ phenomenal concept strategy.  He 
attempts to locate the phenomenal aspect more explicitly in the physical functional workings of the brain.  A 
quotational concept in some way employs the very conscious state that one is thinking about.  Papineau 
(2007) is perhaps easier to understand in regards how those phenomenal concepts are referenced.  He tells 
us a phenomenal concept may feature in the physical-functional brain operation somehow similarly to a how 
a word or phrase features in an explanation: by quotation, in that a phenomenal concept will feature 
phenomenal aspects of experience as like encapsulated in quotation marks as “that experience”.  Papineau 
gives a plausible explanation of how facets of cognition may causally relate to such a phenomenal concept, 
including a simple model of how the brain could use those cognitive aspects or information packets for other 
processes. 
  Papineau spends pages specifying his understanding of phenomenal concepts as a special case of the species 
of perceptual concept (pp114-20), as stored sensory templates which function to enable our visual sense and 
visual imagination.  These templates connect to various cognitive functions, partly serving as ‘file holders’ for 
associated information.  He posits a ‘structural hierarchy’ which allows the phenomenal concept to signal 
either tokens or types depending on whichever sort the information is appropriate for, and which vary in how 
present they are to consciousness.  Papineau aims to improve his 2002 theory which ran into problems 
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because featuring “that experience” tended to illegitimately run together both the phenomenal aspect of the 
experience and the experience applied in a theory of experience (presumably flirting with semantic transfer), 
when it should have explained those aspects of phenomenal concepts instead of presupposing them (p.121).  
His new thinking has phenomenal concepts as a special case subset of perceptual concepts, which will 
underwrite more sophisticated conceptual abilities for remembering specific colour shades for example than 
seemed possible with the type demonstrative concepts from Levin and Loar.  Most of the article concerns the 
modelling of a neural ‘filing system’ and as far as I can tell is uninformative regarding the hard problem.  
Indeed, it largely seems to concern the easy problem of consciousness by describing the layering of cognitive 
mechanisms which could perform functions in relation to phenomenal concepts.4   
  It is most curious how the quotational element of phenomenal concepts is supposed to work in relation to 
percepts.  Papineau’s construal of ‘using’ and ‘mentioning’ phenomenal concepts (p.125-6) conditions his 
response to the knowledge argument.  Being careful not to put words in Papineau’s mouth, “…phenomenal 
references to an experience will deploy an instance of that experience, and in this sense will use that 
experience in order to mention it.” (2007, p.123).  He explains that when a phenomenal concept is exercised, 
a sensory template that is shared between real perception and visual imagination is activated.  Phenomenal 
thought can then use that template to think about the perceptual experience itself, as distinct from the object 
of the experience.  Any exercise of a phenomenal concept is like this, it will use either the experience of seeing 
a tree or the seeing the true just in the mind’s eye.  Then counting that imaginative experience as a “version” 
of the actual experience allows us, “to say that phenomenal thinking about a given experience will always use 
a version of that experience in order to mention that experience.” (p.123).  Papineau then evokes what is 
often called (since Moore) the transparency of perception: when we try to focus on the visual sensation or 
the qualia of the tree, we effectively just look more intently at the tree.  (Personally, I seem able to parse the 
two things when I am looking at the tree.  I say ‘seem’ because I am unsure how to articulate what I have in 
mind when I make that effort.  Papineau does nod to this sort of possibility by saying he will bypass potential 
 
4 the ‘easy problem’ named in comparison with the hard problem because explanations of cognitive functions that do not 
include qualia are more obviously amenable to regular scientific causal explanation (Chalmers 1995). 
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debate about this (because presumably it will not affect his argument)).  Papineau claims it is 
phenomenologically equivalent to think “phenomenally about an experience,” and to think “perceptually with 
that experience”.   He claims there is no difference in what it is like to concentrate on the visual phenomenon 
of the tree, and what it is like to see the tree.  He argues that because the same sensory template serves both 
the perceptual experience and various phenomenal thoughts about that experience, it follows that they both 
share the same phenomenology.  I understand how my imagining of the tree after the experience could use 
a perceptual template that I acquired when I saw the tree, but not why we should say that my imagining and 
the experience both share the same phenomenology.  For all his talk of imagining the phenomenon, it seems 
that my phenomenal thoughts about the tree and my percept from the tree might only feel the same (for 
arguments sake) when I am looking at the tree.   
  Papineau discusses a surprising implication of his view, which helps clarify my dissatisfaction with it.  His 
phenomenal concepts derive semantic capacity from the cognitive functions they perform and not from their 
phenomenal aspect.  The concepts ‘gather’ information about experiences which grounds how they refer to 
those experiences, and they are in part constituted by versions of the experiences with whom they share 
what-it’s-likeness (WIL).  Papineau concedes that the WIL aspect seems not involved in any essential part of 
the semantic operations of the phenomenal concept.  To bring this out he evokes a thought experiment 
whereby humans evolved to attach information about experiences to words in some language of thought 
instead of sensory templates.  Those brain states would equally refer to experiences, even though their 
activation does not involve any sharing of phenomenality with their referents.  If this is right Papineau says, 
then it will challenge his idea that phenomenal concepts, “involve some distinctive mode of phenomenal self-
reference to experiences.” (2007, p.125).  And if the phenomenal element of a concept achieves nothing 
toward that concepts capacity to refer, then how he asks, should we understand the notion that they are 
distinctively phenomenal?  The language of thought model cannot ‘quote’ any version of the experience in 
the way a phenomenal concept is supposed to, and likewise he tells us that any functionalist account that has 
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causal stand-ins for the phenomenal aspect that are supposed to refer to experience for the same reason as 
phenomenal concepts do, is open to the same worry. 
  After describing this worry, Papineau curiously tells us that there is not really a problem here:  other brain 
states which satisfy the same cognitive function by referring to experiences for the same reason as a 
phenomenal concept can carry out the same role because with his account it is only the cognitive function 
carried out by the phenomenal concept and not its phenomenology that refers to the experience.  He sees it 
as a further question whether we wish to categorise those nonphenomenological (language of thought) states 
as ‘phenomenal’ given their lack of WIL, and in any case that would provide, “no ground for denying that they 
would refer to experiences for just the same reason that phenomenal concepts do” (p.125).  I judged this 
move curious because it inclines me to wonder what help the PCS can be to understanding Mary’s epistemic 
situation if it can just substitute the WIL aspect completely.  It makes Mary’s impression of red inconsequent 
to proceedings.  Papineau gestures an explanation about the brain featuring the phenomenal aspect of 
phenomenal concepts just because they are automatically present along with their referents so brain 
evolution would not over burden itself when it can with least redundancy activate that ideal thought vehicle 
of the perceptual sensory template for thinking about those “selfsame experiences” (p.126).  This approach 
disowns the spirit announced by the originator of the PCS who empathised with the intuition that phenomenal 
qualities cannot reduce to brain activity or any physical-functional type, and aimed the PCS so to, “…provide 
some relief, or at least some distance, from the illusory metaphysical intuition.” (Loar 1997, p.598).  Other 
than some plausible sounding out of the easy problem of consciousness, Papineau has provided very little 
relief from any metaphysical illusion.  The WIL element of experience which he claims can in principle be 
replaced with brain architecture not involving any phenomenal aspect (with no difference in behaviour), 
indicates that all his discussion about conceptual operations is all on the functional-physical side of the 
equation and so does nothing to dissolve the intuition of non-identity which motivates the hard problem.  His 
phenomenal concepts are consistent with zombies or robots experiencing no phenomenology (the lights are 
on but there is nobody home).  I suppose he would view that favourably because it sidesteps problems with 
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qualia, but it also makes his solution incommensurate with the hard problem.  I will next consider what 
Papineau carries over for explicitly engaging the knowledge argument. 
  We might wonder what essentially qualifies a phenomenal concept as phenomenal in Papineau’s view if a 
non-phenomenal language of thought architecture can be causally equivalent.  He parries this question away 
as one of definition which he is content to leave open, and offers a response to the knowledge argument 
which relies on other features of phenomenal concepts; Mary lacks the phenomenal concept of the 
experience of seeing red, which she can only gain upon seeing red.  Then she will have acquired the sensory 
template which allows her to know about the experience of red in a phenomenal way which she can then 
correlate with her knowledge of brain waves and light frequency and what have you (I hesitate to say 
‘correlates’ the phenomenal with what she already knows about seeing red, because she is supposed to be 
learning of an identity.  This hesitation goes to the issue of whether having closed the explanatory gap, will 
she no longer intuit the non-identity?).  Papineau leaves the phenomenal aspect in that black box handed out 
in Chapter two by Dennett, when he tells us the WIL is a contingent feature of humans for which we are 
constituted to configure sensory templates, but if we were differently constituted then we wouldn’t need the 
experience to know what red looks like.   
  Papineau ends his brief discussion of the knowledge argument (p.128) by claiming one way his account is 
more powerful than other PCS accounts (those which require the phenomenal aspect to be activated when 
thinking related thoughts).  He thinks we can use phenomenally derived information (as attached information 
files), to think about a particular experience without the cognition needing to ‘mention’ that experience and 
that this is a way that a phenomenal concept can qualify as “phenomenal” without a WIL aspect; it only needs 
to be phenomenally derived to qualify.  Firstly, it is not obvious that I can infer or remember something from 
an experience of red without that phenomenal aspect appearing in some however minimal way to my mind’s 
eye.  Secondly, even if this is psychologically possible, his account only seems an improvement on Loar and 
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Levin in terms of offering more substantive profiling of the cognitive architecture that might support 
phenomenal concepts, which is just the easy problem again.5 
  Balog (2012) effectively offers further detail for a quotational account in terms of phenomenal conceptual 
structure explained with reference to levels of ‘mentalese’ as items in a language of thought.  Balog elaborates 
a unique way in which we reference phenomenal concepts by experiential acquaintance, which I understand 
as another way of implementing Papineau’s notion of ‘mention’.  Balog’s aim is to put the nature of 
acquaintance to work more explicitly in the semantic-causal workings of phenomenal concepts so to obviate 
the inclination to posit nonphysical mental states.  I will resist engaging more with Balog because her theory 
is effectively an elaboration of Papineau’s, and clashes even more with Levine’s materialistic constraint.  I 
murmured that Papineau’s and Balog’s speculations about cognitive architecture only amount to a ‘just-so 
causal story’ as far as concerns the metaphysical nature of phenomenal qualities.  I mean that while their 
causal profiling of cognition may be coherent, the plausibility of their accounts to that extent does not reach 
out to satisfactorily feature the experiential properties that feature in the hard problem.  This is along the 
same lines as Levine’s complaint about the quotational strategy, “trying to explain the substantivity of 
acquaintance by appeal to the cognitive presence of phenomenal properties in our phenomenal concepts, 
which, in turn, is explained by physical presence.” (2018, p.15) 
  I have chosen to briefly consider a theory by David Pitt (2019) (which is unmentioned by Robinson) because 
it targets the plausibility of the PCS in relation to my ‘big-picture’ objection that the whole approach only 
amounts to a ‘just-so-story’, and will also back up my earlier two worries about Papineau’s ‘shared 
phenomenology’ between perceptual and phenomenal concepts, and my psychological failure to attend to 
phenomenally derived information without activating sensory imagination, which Papineau appealed to. 
 
5 Robinson reports that Papineau told him in conversation that the PCS is not concerned with the hard problem, but with the 
knowledge argument, the conceivability of zombies, and the explanatory gap.  Robinson claims that understanding misconstrues 
the knowledge argument as a de dicto problem.  Correctly understood he claims, the knowledge argument is a de re problem, 
“to explain physicalistically the phenomenal quality that figures in the experience, not just to explain the role of the concept that 
characterises it.”(2016, p81). 
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  Pitt (2019) defends the view that for Mary to know what red is like just is to experience it.  He claims that 
upon seeing red, Mary does not acquire propositional knowledge or concepts, or an ability: in experience she 
simply becomes acquainted or familiar with a phenomenal property, and to know what a kind of experience 
is like is to be acquainted with those phenomenal qualities which characterise it.  He calls this epistemological 
category “acquaintance-knowledge”.   
  Pitt emphasises the distinction between acquaintance knowledge which Mary acquires and knowledge by 
acquaintance.  He thinks Earl Conee (1994) first proposed this account of Marys new knowledge calling it 
‘phenomenal knowledge’, and that it may have been what Bertrand Russell meant when he said “there is no 
difference between the experience and knowing that you have it.” (1940, p49).  It is distinct from propositional 
knowledge which can be derived from the acquaintance.  Pitt specifies that when one has knowledge that a 
phenomenal property Q is like this, then the demonstrative ‘like this’ refers to an instance of Q.  Pitt will argue 
that this approach is the only way to substantiate the claim that Mary gains new knowledge, and it will involve 
the rejection of phenomenal concepts. 
  Pitt understands phenomenology to be constituted by discrete items which cannot be ‘broken up’ in any way 
needed to support a cognitive architecture like that proposed by the PCS.  This crucial aspect of Pitt’s proposal 
undercuts the PCS: “There is nothing one can think once one has experienced red that one could not think 
before experiencing it” (2019, p.89).    
  Pitt thinks that none of the ways the PCS individuates the content of a phenomenal concept by experiencing 
a quality can work; neither in virtue of referring to it, or by being a constituent in the manner of Papineau and 
Balog.  Pitt tells us that intuitively, concepts cannot be either percepts or images because these are 
fundamentally distinct sorts of mental things, shown by the fact that we have concepts for things which cannot 
in principle be imagined or perceived.  We might also have concepts of perceptible items which we cannot 
imagine like hens with 508 red spots.  We can think about such things without being able to imagine them, so 
those concepts cannot be percepts or images.  There is also the other the side of the coin; things we can 
perceive and imagine but cannot conceptualise, like when we stare at a scene or perhaps a non-thinking 
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animal looks at a field.  Pitt insists that conceptual contents must be thinkable while images and percepts are 
in a different category of mental items which makes them necessarily not thinkable things.  In that way, for 
one to report that they are thinking about the smell of a rose is a nonsensical category mistake.  The sense in 
which we might think of such things he says is by possessing, “otherwise-content-individuated concepts that 
can refer to them.” (2019, p.91).   
  Pitts overarching framework is that there exists a distinct experience of thinking; a proprietary 
phenomenology of cognition, which he calls ‘cognitive phenomenology’ (2004), and which is individuated and 
distinct from those other proprietary modes of experience like seeing and hearing.  While this is a 
controversial thesis employing a small cottage industry of philosophers arguing for and against either the 
existence of cognitive phenomenology as a whole or sub-categories such as the phenomenology of different 
sorts of thinking (see Bayne et al, 2011). I take the plausibility of Pitts theory as support to hold up my 
categorising the PCS as a ‘just-so-story’ of causal modelling and almost irrelevant to the hard problem.  
  The metaphysical case for cognitive phenomenology (Pitt 2011) starts from the purported fact that conscious 
states must be phenomenally individuated if they are conscious at all.  Sights and sounds are of a different 
kind than conceptual thoughts and are phenomenally constituted by radically distinct kinds of phenomenal 
properties, which undercuts how phenomenal concepts are supposed to work.  Pitt insists there is no such 
thing as cross-modal experiences like smelling colours or hearing smells.  According to Pitt, conceptual 
thinking is ontologically distinct in the way scent and sound are distinct; one can only cognitively experience 
thoughts.  The crucial inference Pitt wants to make from this is that phenomenal concepts cannot be 
individuated as the PCS proposes.  The conscious process itself is what individuates cognitive phenomenal 
concepts which are ontologically independent of the sense modalities (2019, p93).   
 Phenomenal concepts proposed as cognitive-phenomenal experiences, if Pitt is right they cannot have 
colours as constituents, so there is no such thing as the red-percept-or-image-containing concept for Mary to 
acquire when she leaves the room.  Those percepts or image like phenomenal items can, according to Pitt be 
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thought about, by applying a concept to them, but the content of the phenomenal concepts cannot involve 
non-cognitive phenomenology. 
Perhaps my simple idea of juxtaposing the plausibility of Pitts theory with the PCS doesn’t require the laying 
out I have provided but my point comes further into view when we consider that the epistemology and 
ontology posited by Pitt is neutral in regards the ontological status of the properties she becomes acquainted 
with upon first seeing red.  Acquaintance knowledge is a way of knowing a phenomenal property which 
requires direct experience of that property.  All sides agree on this.  He tells us that acquaintance knowledge 
is a fundamental type of knowledge for phenomenal properties, and that while we may become acquainted 
with theoretical entities like a 20-sided shape by seeing a picture of one, it is not the only way of knowing it 
such is the case with a phenomenal property.  Just because Mary is not acquainted with red inside the room 
need not entail that red is not a physical property.  She just gains a new way of knowing certain things, whether 
they are physical or not, and this way is only achieved while partaking of the acquaintance.   
  What all the accounts of the PCS have in common is their attempt to articulate how the notion of a concept 
may effect intimate relations with phenomenal qualities in closing the explanatory gap, while making no 
progress on the metaphysical nature of those properties such is required if progress is to be made on the hard 
problem, but this notion of acquaintance knowledge which is compatible with physicalism may point the most 
reasonable way of settling the knowledge argument. 
  The intuitively attractive category of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ described by Russell and Pitt is a sort that 
can only be gained by having an experience.  It seems a cogent thought that Mary was born blind and learnt 
all the physical facts about colour and vision through braille, yet just because she will never know what it is 
like to see anything, it would not follow that physicalism must be false.  This need not be knock down against 
the knowledge argument because it skirts over a lot that has been considered in previous and coming chapters 
but it does alert us to what seems to be an obvious form of belief, even in perhaps the weakest case of an 
animal looking on the world.  This sense of acquaintance seems in line with how Wittgenstein understood the 
universe as the totality of facts in the sense of being part of what constitutes reality and not just what can be 
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written down in books (Crane 2019).  These sorts of facts cannot be learned or conveyed but only experienced 
and it would seem obvious that physicalism need not be required to specify all such facts.  This approach 
makes room for the thought that we can learn about things we might already know about in a new way, by 
seeing them in a ‘different light’.  Terrence Horgan (1984) responded to the knowledge argument in this sort 
of way to resist the idea that Mary’s new experience cannot be about something physical which she already 
knew about as is usually thought to be shown by the classic Frege example of the morning and the evening 
star.   
  More will be said in later chapters about why physicalism need not capture all that can be specified about 
physical stuff and how this might relate to science.  For now, I will leave it as an intuitively appealing way that 
physicalism might not be threatened by the knowledge argument.  Galen Strawson (2018) takes essentially 
the same line by driving a distinction between physicalism and "physics-alism" (2018, p.125), and argues that 
the knowledge argument only defeats the latter which would portend to capture all knowledge as grounded 
or made true by physics.  
 













Chapter 6.   Donald Davidson and Non-Reduction. 
 
 
Non-reductive materialism is a category of position on the mind body problem which in various ways aims to 
establish a view that mental properties although constituted by physical matter are causally efficacious and 
not reducible to physical properties.  It might be characterised as an attempt to find a way between reductive 
materialism and dualism.  Donald Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ is a famous early attempt of this.  I must 
attempt a slashing economy in specifying basic aspects of Davidsons otherwise very sophisticated ideas, to 
the extent Robinson features them in his broad negative thesis against physicalism.  Robinson argues that 
Anomalous Monism is reductive and Davidson’s use or understanding of the notion of ‘non-reductive’ is 
unclear and that ambiguity has encouraged regular misunderstandings of the notion.  Chapter nine will involve 
fuller discussion of reductionism. 
  Robinson distinguishes the two main senses of reduction which have not plausibly accommodated mental 
properties into a physicalist ontology.  The first sense which is specific to philosophy of mind is the attempt to 
account for the mind in behavioural or functional terms, where psychological predicates for properties of first 
person sensations are analysed as dispositions to behave or functional states defined by their contribution to 
behaviour.  The second sense is by scientific reduction of psychological properties to properties of physics.  
This involves a unified understanding of science to the extent that there exist bridging laws through the 
physical sciences of biology, chemistry and neuroscience, all reducible to physics so that the constitution of 
psychological states can be made out in physical terms.   
  Robinson describes the (British) philosophical culture as resisting what it viewed as the counterintuitive 
theories from Ryle, Smart and Armstrong (2016, p95), which represented those two reductive paradigms, and 
which understood Davidson’s ‘Mental Events’ (1970) to be an attempt at an alternative non-reductive theory.  
Davidson used an ontology of events, whereby each physical event is also a mental event, and both events 
are constituted by the same causal relations, which seemed to avoid the requirement of reducing mental 
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properties to physical properties (more on this below).  Robinson argues that Davidson does not avoid law 
like reduction in a way which requires an analytic reduction like functionalism.  I will not argue with that 
reading of Davidson, but I will dispute some of Robinson’s analysis that could affect the conclusions he draws. 
  Robinson offers a picture of Davidsons ontology of events as a ‘flagpole’ theory of events, whereby a single 
event (the flagpole) has a physical aspect and a mental aspect (two flags flying).  A single event can instantiate 
physical brain properties and the mental properties of experiencing a quale, just like the flagpole can hold two 
flags of different colours.  The single event is identified by its cause and consequences, and not by the 
noncausal properties of the event in the way the flagpole identity is not dependent on the colour of the flags.  
Davidson’s theory is widely held (Yalowitz 2019, sec 6.1) to render the mental properties of the event as 
epiphenomenal because the physical properties of the event would do all the causal work for physical effects, 
leaving no causal involvement for mental properties (Honderich, 1982).  Howsoever the event might be 
described, it is only those physical properties that are sufficient to make physical things happen, leaving 
mental properties unnecessary for causal processes (we should note that Davidson (1993) himself was alert 
to this scientific principle of physical causal closure, but that he understood the causal relation to fall under 
different metaphysical principles).  This principle of ‘no overdetermination’ is also widely supported by 
philosophers (Robb & Hale 2019, sec 2.4), leaving livelier dispute around related notions of explanation, to 
which Robinson attends as we will now see. 
  Robinson cites this charge of epiphenomenalism in two ways, the first of which is “…the irrelevance of mental 
states or properties to causal explanation is itself constitutive of epiphenomenalism, for interaction involves 
causal explanatory relevance.” (2016 p.97).  Robinson argues for the causal relevance of mental properties 
based on their explanatory value, which I will argue is unsuccessful.  The cogency of my claims need not 
challenge his conclusion that Davidson’s theory is effectively a reductive functionalism, but they may inform 
our view of Robinson’s positive thesis later (which as far as I can tell, is why Robinson is motivated to present 
a limited defence of anomalous monism).   
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   Robinson claims the “accusation” (p.98) which I have quoted in the last paragraph is rendered inconclusive.  
He appeals to an aspect of Davidson’s later developed thesis (1993) which will save it from the sort of 
objection which I referenced above about physical properties making mental properties causally redundant.  
Davidson says ‘strict’ laws may only operate at the level of fundamental physics, and while it is only with such 
laws at the level of physics or those sciences nomically reducible to physics that we can generate strict causal 
explanations, now Robinson: 
“There are looser forms of causal explanation at higher levels, including the psychological, and so it 
becomes just as proper to explain causally human action by reference to human thought as it is, for 
example, to explain the destruction of a village by reference to the force of a hurricane, given that 
meteorology is not nomically reducible to physics.  In neither the psychological nor meteorological 
cases are there strict causal explanations…but there is what we intuitively recognise as causal 
explanation.  If Davidson’s theory allows our mental states to be casually on a par with hurricanes, it 
would not seem just to accuse him of epiphenomenalism.” (2016, p.99).   
 
I do not offer interpretation of Davidson’s theory, my claim is that Robinson is not entitled to cite equivalent 
‘properness’ of causal explanation across the meteorological and psychological domains (regardless of nomic 
reducibility), to the extent needed to justify his inference.  It is not the case that mental properties can 
properly feature in a causal explanation of human action in the same way that hurricanes feature in a causal 
explanation of the village gone.  We can take it that a ‘hurricane’ is a convenient reference to a collection or 
sum of physical properties which constitute that hurricane.  It follows there is nothing counter intuitive by 
claiming that the casual consequences of the hurricane be identified with the physical properties of which it 
consists.  In the case of the mental event, Robinson requires the reference to the human action to be other 
than an appropriate reference to the collection of physical properties which constitute that mental event, and 
he has given no reason why it need be anything more than a convenient reference and so the original 
objection is still in play because the mental property explanation is causally grounded in the efficacy of the 
physical properties.6  The psychological explanation will not support an inference for reifying ultimately 
 
6 My objection is prompted by Jaegwon Kim’s problem of explanatory exclusion (1989). 
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nonphysical causes, in contrast to the meteorological explanation which is consistent with purely physical 
causes and so the accusation of epiphenomenalism appears just. 
  Robinson discusses another way the epiphenomenalism accusation might arise because of Davidsons unclear 
presentation of how exactly mental properties are supposed to supervene on the physical.  Robinson is of 
course alert to the distinction I make above between causation and explanation and says that psychological 
properties must be nomically reducible to the physical in the same sort of way as special sciences or else the 
monism of Davidson’s theory is threatened: “mental properties are just high-level descriptions of the array of 
physically present signals,…Davidson has shown that there can be different descriptions of the same subject 
matter that are not nomically related to each other, without this rendering any of them wholly otiose in causal 
explanations…” (2016, p.101).  Davidson’s theory in this way is rendered ontologically reductive which is the 
sense we are interested in and so fails as a non-reductive physicalist theory. 
  Robinson (2008) claims we find clarity on Davidson’s position from his 1987, ‘Problems On The Explanation 
of Action’.  Here we find the thesis that normativity is essential to psychological explanations but not to the 
other special physical sciences, but even if that were true (which Robinson argues is unlikely), we find no 
explanation of how psychology is reconcilable to monism  (2008, p.141).  Davidson’s position collapses into a 
form of non-realism about mental properties, in a way which supports my earlier point that Davidson’s 
mentalistic causal relations are only language dependent, “…the mental is not an ontological but a conceptual 
category…To say of an event…that it is mental, is simply to say that we can describe it in a certain vocabulary 
– and the mark of that vocabulary is semantic intentionality.” (Davidson 1987, p.46). 
  Robinson goes on to make the case that this sort of irreducibility stemming from the essential normativity of 
psychology inspired an approach to the mind body problem which he labels ‘Naturalism without physicalism’.  
These theories are enough off target not to detain us, so I will just mention them for completeness due to 
their historical significance:  John McDowell (1994) ‘Mind and Word’, H. Price (2011) ‘Naturalism Without 




Chapter 7.    Mysterianism, Neutral Monism and Panpsychism. 
 
 
  We may view the topics of Chapter seven as minority positions on the mind body problem.  For that reason 
and the space available I must proceed to more central concerns about arguments for physicalism entailing 
epiphenomenalism and then Robinsons positive case for substance dualism.  With a previous draft I attempted 
elaboration of the issues in this chapter, but there is not the space for worthwhile philosophical insight, which 
is anyway least relevant to Robinson’s thesis compared to the areas yet to be covered.  I will summarise what 
Robinson argues from chapter seven with simple mention of theories for some level of completeness. 
  Standard mainstream physicalist accounts that we have considered before this chapter cannot account for 
the qualitative aspect of the conscious mind.  McGinn (1989) argues that the constitution of our minds means 
we are cut off from understanding the mind body problem which will remain a mystery.  Stoljar (2006) argues 
that science cannot exhaustively probe the nature of matter which would enable us to understand how 
conscious qualities are constituted.  Bertrand Russell (1927) invented the theory called ‘neutral monism’, 
around the idea that physics can only investigate relational properties of matter, but not those intrinsic 
properties that may somehow include or constitute phenomenal properties.  Galen Strawson (2006) and Philip 
Goff (2017, 2019) defend the thesis of ‘panpsychism’ which build on Russell to make conscious properties 







7 Bibliographical note.  Considering the lack of progress made by traditional approaches, I register Goff 
(unread by Robinson at time of his writing) presenting a plausible research program. 
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Chapter 8.   Conclusion of Part One. 
 
  This chapter is somewhat pivotal for Robinson’s overall treatise.  He presents his concluding treatment of 
the nature of qualia with arguments effectively linking his rejection of physicalism to his license for substance 
dualism.  The standard physicalist accounts I have reviewed in this chapter have fallen short in their accounting 
for Marys new experience.  Robinson concludes with an attempt to ‘strengthen’ the knowledge argument and 
achieve a more radical conclusion that physicalism is incoherent without this accounting.  I object to his 
arguments.   
  Standard forms of physicalism considered so far have not presented a satisfactory response to the knowledge 
argument and Robinson will argue that physicalists have not appreciated the comprehensive force of the 
argument.  He presents the dialectical situation to be one where the knowledge argument may support 
property dualism to the extent that physicalism adequately accounts for non-conscious reality which 
constitutes “almost 100% of the universe” (2016, p.133).  But that the physicalist account struggles with that 
qualitative aspect of consciousness as Chalmers calls ‘the hard problem’, from which it would follow that 
qualia have “nothing to do with our robust conception of the physical as it applies to the vast mindless tracts 
of reality”. (p.133).  As I understand Robinson, He reads this situation as providing physicalists strong prima 
facie reason to expect some sort of physicalist account to theoretically absorb that extensionally miniscule 
aspect of the universe, which is a strange way of book keeping ontological categories, but I think he is speaking 
as to the inclination of the physicalist mind set.  Jaegwon Kim (2007) is a notable physicalist who somewhat 
concurs with this big picture rendering of the situation, naming his influential book “Physicalism or Something 
Near Enough”.  Robinson claims this dialectic radically misrepresents the actual situation because we should 
attend to the conception of physical matter rather than the mind.   
  Robinson explains that because science is mainly concerned with measurement and expressing its findings 
in mathematics, the result is an abstraction which cannot wholly capture our common-sensical conception of 
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the physical world and to this extent our abstract scientific concept of the physical is insufficiently concrete.8  
What is needed to concretise that abstraction is the addition of qualities – essentially sensible qualities – that 
figure so importantly in our naïve or common-sensical conception of the world.  These are essential to our 
ability to ‘cash’ or ‘model’ or ‘interpret’ the abstract, mathematical conception.” (p134).  Robinson will argue 
with this idea that we can generate a much stronger understanding of the hard problem in terms of the 
knowledge argument.  Whereas the normal takeaway from the knowledge argument might be that 
physicalism cannot explain qualia, Robinson wants to argue in addition that any physicalist conception beyond 
what can be abstractly and mathematically expressed must essentially feature qualia, and he takes this to 
show that physicalism is not, “merely incomplete, failing to cope with consciousness, but something more like 
incoherent, because it cannot give a coherent account of the physical itself.” (p.135).  Robinson claims that 
his arguments show that not only if the knowledge argument is sound then physicalism cannot capture qualia, 
but that all known attempts to refute the knowledge argument are undercut, because they all rest on a 
problematic conception of the physical.  
  His argument is that the knowledge argument generalises to include those primary qualities of objects which 
characterise the world aside from our perception, and not just the secondary qualities which are essentially 
subjective.  He takes ‘squareness’ as an example of a primary quality which unlike the secondary quality ‘red’ 
is not defined in terms of what it is like to perceive it, but neither is the definition independent of our 
perception of squareness, for otherwise our conception would be “wholly axiomatic and mathematical.” 
(p.135).  He presses that while secondary qualities attach to a particular mode of experience and primary 
qualities do not, they must however be some way experienced by sight or touch in our case, or else he insists, 
we would have no conception of spatial properties beyond the abstract.  He claims that it follows from this 
that physicalism without sensible qualities would lack any empirical content.   
  My objection is that physicalism as a doctrine need not include any specification of how humans come to 
learn about physical stuff or how they conduct science.  Physicalism does not require a rationale about how 
 
8 Goff (2019) emphasises this backdrop to science and argues it has plagued our understanding of physics since Galileo. 
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we acquire knowledge.  It will be interesting to locate Mary in relation to Robinson’s idea (although it is 
unnecessary for my basic objection).  It is one thing for Mary to be cut off from colour and so ignorant of what 
it is like to see colour, but we would have to imagine Mary born limbless in a pitch black sensory deprivation 
tank with only auditory stimulation for Robinsons idea to gain any purchase because we would need to deprive 
her of perceptual connection to spatial properties, and then hypothesise that scenario Mary has learnt all the 
physical scientific facts about spatial properties which seems a contradiction.  Even if we imagine it could 
happen and Mary became fitted with a bionic arm, she would of course be surprised at her first experience 
of touch.  This would not support any intuition against physicalism like Jacksons Mary might.  Robinsons idea 
is driven by notions of sense capacity rather than any idea that everything is ultimately physical.  There is no 
reason why physicalists need deny that knowledge can be gained only through experience of some sort.   
  Robinson is not fazed by my suggestion that it may be impossible to imagine experience like ours without 
spatial features, because some sort of particular perception is necessary for an empirically contentful 
conception to go beyond a purely axiomatic concept (2016, p.136).  This amounts to psychological speculation 
which will not defeat my simple objection that physicalism is secure even if he is right.  (His claim in foot note 
1, that the potential impossibility of a developed mind like sensory-deprived-Mary is not to the point, is simply 
an attempt to instil the intuition that such a situation is possible, which seems redundant if such a case is 
beside the point!).  There is some indication that Robinson is illegitimately equivocating physicalism with a 
descriptive-account-of-reality, which might drive the fault in his argument here against physicalism:  “If, in 
general, the acquisition of experience did not teach something new, then a purely descriptive account of 
reality ought not to lack anything essential…physicalism that depends on a notion of the physical that is 
somehow independent of the qualitative nature of experience can only present us with a world that is so 
formal as to be empirically contentless.” (p.137).  To repeat my objection: physicalism does not require a 
rationale about how we acquire knowledge.   
  I take the rest of chapter eight to be trading on this equivocation or something close enough which confuses 
empiricism as a doctrine about how we only acquire knowledge through the senses, with physicalism as a 
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doctrine to the effect that everything conforms to the condition of being physical.  Relatedly, a parallel 
knowledge-argument-for-primary-qualities does not get off the ground because there is no sense to the 
starting hypothesis to the effect that Mary could know all the physical properties of space before leaving her 
sensory deprivation tank.  We can partially accept Robinson’s conclusion to part one that the standard 
physicalist responses to the knowledge argument which I have reviewed up to Chapter Five are unsatisfactory 
and that qualia are essential cement for our empiricist understanding of the world, but he has not shown that 
physicalism is incoherent because of that.   
   This is the end of part one.  I am persuaded that these standard physicalist responses to the knowledge 
argument which I have surveyed are not wholly adequate to answering Robinson’s take on the hard problem 
as conveyed by the knowledge argument, while the notion of knowledge by acquaintance might hold the 
resources to fend of the threat to physicalism.  In part two I will shift from researching other philosopher’s 
positions to engage Robinson’s arguments for ‘conceptualism’, which he proposes as a step on the way to 
dualism. 
  I next analyse Part Two of Robinson’s treatise starting with chapter nine and consisting of four quite 
independent arguments for why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism for mental properties.  I allocate 
weighted space to each chapter according to the extent I judge they illuminate the mind body problem and 















Chapter 9.   Reductionism and the status of the special sciences. 
 
  In this part of his treatise Robinson argues from several approaches that phenomena which are not 
metaphysically basic, are dependent on the mind.  In this chapter Robinson presents a thesis about reduction 
which entails either that the properties of the special sciences including psychology are epiphenomenal, or 
they are formed by an ineliminable interpretation which an observer conceives from the objective physical 
base which places the mind outside of the physical, amounting to dualism.  Chapter ten and eleven develop 
an account of vagueness and composite objects respectively, upon which his argument for the mind 
dependence of non-basic entities will also depend.  I judge that his argument in chapter nine is clearest and 
most germane and relevant for now and the last sixty years of research on the mind body problem (see 
McLaughlin et al, 2011), which I will apply as a sort of meta-justification given word constraints for relatively 
less focus on vagueness and composite objects.  I will begin by presenting a basic groundwork for the notion 
of reduction, to frame Robinson’s explanation of the problem and to the extent that it is important for a 
physicalist solution to the mind body problem.   
  One may picture the physical sciences as consisting of different levels of description for a physical object.  
Let us take an oak tree: physics, chemistry, and biology will each cite properties of the oak tree using 
proprietary vocabularies, while referring to that one chunk of physical reality which is the tree.  A core issue 
For Robinson is how we understand the relationship between these different scientific descriptions and 
associated ontology at each level, given that they all concern the same tree.  A usual claim is that physics cites 
the fundamental description to which the special sciences are reducible. 
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  Reduction between the sciences is understood as nomological (lawful) reduction; physics and chemistry both 
are taken to specify physical properties which constitute the physical matter of the tree, with each level of 
description connected by bridging laws that connect the laws of each science.  Nagel 1961 is the classic 
exposition of this model, from which I take bridging laws to be like algorithms which can relate properties 
between the domains.  This is a swift description of scientific reduction which Robinson explicates over many 
pages in chapter nine, where he also elaborates links with other historical notions of reduction and purported 
compatibility between them.9  The crucial question for us is how psychological properties might supervene 
on physical properties or whether they are reducible to the physical base ontology.  We will best concentrate 
on that discussion which is most up to date with contemporary theory where he describes, “ ‘A priori 
sufficiency of the base’ reductionism” (2016, p.153).   
  David Chalmers (1996) calls this type of reductionism, ‘logical supervenience’, which is intended to capture 
a weak version of reduction for mental properties like qualia supervening on the brain where nomological 
reduction cannot be seen to be feasible.  This sort of minimal supervenience between the properties cited at 
each level of description can be seen to characterise a relation of non-reduction, but a weaker relation of 
dependence of qualia on the brain.  For illustration: 
“There is no logically possible world which, at the level of physics, is just like one in which a hurricane 
is destroying a village, but in which a there is not a hurricane destroying: the physics base is a priori 
sufficient.  There is no need to invoke some elusive conception of supervenience here: in the broadest 
sense of ‘logically possible’, there is no possible world with the same physical base as the given one 
and no hurricane; the relation is one of entailment in the strongest sense…[in the same sort of way]…If 
some version of functionalism were correct about the mind, having atoms arranged just as they are 
on earth would be logically sufficient - though not necessary, for there might be other ways of making 
minds – for the existence of conscious beings.” (2016, p153).   
 
  Logical supervenience only requires a dependence of facts between the levels where there can be no 
difference in dependent level facts without a difference in base level facts and so constitutes a logical 
entailment, which contrasts with nomological supervenience involving a causal dependence between levels.  
 
9 I will resist going over all that which in any case is technical and controversial and instead attempt to later 
bring out those aspects crucial to his argument.   
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A place holder term which covers all the ways in which properties may be reducible whereby any non-
fundamental properties depend on the fundamental properties of physics, so that any difference in base 
properties means a difference in chemical and biological and psychological properties.  Supervenience by itself 
only indicates a dependence or covariance relation (McLaughlin & Bennet 2018, 3.7).  It will only indicate the 
direction of dependence by saying biological properties supervene on chemical properties or the colour of a 
painting supervenes on the paint, but the way supervenience occurs is presumed to be radically different in 
each case and so it may be taken as placeholder for deeper but unexplained relations. 
  Robinson proposes ’explanatory irreducibility’ as a concomitant of logical supervenience; in the case of the 
hurricane which is constituted by nothing other than physical particles, it is the case that explanation at the 
level of hurricanes is not nomically reducible to explanation at the level of physics, which is the same situation 
regarding all the special sciences in relation to physics.  Robinson pairs this explanatory notion to the 
ontological notion about the supervenience of properties.  Properties of the special sciences are said to 
logically supervene while exhibiting independent explanatory value, which we may see as “…just different, 
higher order ways of describing the base subject-matter.” (p.155).  He claims the plausibility of this way of 
viewing the different explanations as motivating a conceptualist approach (which will become central to his 
thesis), and which supports a position of ‘weak property emergence’.  He explains contrasts the weak form 
with ‘real property emergence’, where a property has “no conceptually sufficient conditions in the base for 
its exemplification.” (Ibid).  It is this position we are told which characterises a realist dual aspect theory in the 
philosophy of mind, which rejects the logical supervenience of psychological properties and accepts the 
explanatory gap between the mental and the physical.  He positions the ‘non-reductive physicalist’ as leaning 
on the attempt to create a sort of mid-way position between weak and real property emergence, “Real but 
supervenient property emergence…a property with no conceptually sufficient conditions in the base for its 
occurrence, but with some stronger dependence on that base than merely causal…”(p.155), which he says 
widely confuses what non-reductive physicalism amounts to through a misunderstanding of logical 
supervenience and he implies that this confusion is related to the issues I developed from Davidson in Chapter 
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six.  Robinson claims to have made a plausible case that logical supervenience is the only credible notion of 
reduction, and he will derive some consequences from the limitations of logical supervenience.   (I will not go 
over his earlier positioning of different notions of reduction, which in any case is insufficiently technical to be 
convincing.  Instead I will try to rely on narrow aspects of his case that suffice for his argument).  I will now 
consider and partially object to these purported consequences from which Robinson derives an opening for 
dualism. 
  Fodor (1974) denies that logical supervenience which characterises the dependence of mental on physical 
properties is non-reductive yet need not undermine a physicalist ontology, “because each instance of a higher-
order concept will be identical with some structure describable in terms of basic physics, and nothing more.  
This token reductionism is all that physicalism and the unity of the sciences require.” (2016, p.156).  Token 
reductionism simply means that the sum of fundamental physical items in the base is identical with some set 
of physical items which physically constitute those mental or chemical properties.  Robinson claims that 
“contrary to appearances, this may wrong” (Ibid), and physicalism may require more than token reductionism 
and something more like nomological reduction. 
  Robinson accepts that Fodor is right that the same physical stuff might be irreducibly described in different 
ways, but that Fodor does not explain how this is possible.  Unlike nomological reduction which might explain 
how this can work, with logical supervenience it seems there must be something more over and above 
anything that can be identified with the base.  There are two options he tells us, either there are new 
properties which do no causal work because (in parallel to what we found with Davidsons event ontology) the 
physical properties exhaust causal operations, and this would render psychological properties epiphenomenal 
just like properties of the special sciences, “and hence the fear that physicalism about the mind does not avoid 
epiphenomenalism.”(p.157).  Before we move to the second option, it seems that this just states the mind 
body problem which everybody takes to be mystery, which is not precisely an option as such for the physicalist 
(at least by the large majority who reject epiphenomenalism) as much as it is a problem to solved.  My point 
here would be trivial if it were not that Robinson reads the situation as somehow saddling the physicalist with 
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a second option instead of working on the status of the problem as so far stated which as far as I can see is 
how the research tradition carries on.  My point is perhaps dialectically accommodated by taking Robinson’s 
point more like an attitude whereby he sees the old research program at a complete dead end.   
  The second option is worse for the physicalist and which the rest of his treatise will argue for in favour of the 
first option [‘anything but a resigned epiphenomenalism!’]:  “The special sciences look like a ‘top-down’ 
conceptual interpretation of the base.  This seems to suggest an interpreter or conceptualiser who views the 
world from his own perspective: “They are more like a perspective from outside on the same subject matter.” 
(p.156).  I will extract the contours and analyse this position which Robinson calls ‘perspectivalist’.   
  Robinson characterises Physics as cutting reality at its ultimate joints along with any special science which is 
nomically reducible to physics cutting reality at larger joints such as cosmology.    Those sciences such as 
propositional attitude psychology which are nomically non-reductive and only supervene logically he says 
involve a necessary interpreter because they only emerge because of an interaction between an observer and 
real patterns in the physical world. Robinson claims that this dualism of mind and body may only be 
metaphorical if the mind can be treated as part of the physical domain which is being interpreted, otherwise 
the mental acts must be grounds for ontological dualism.  Robinson proposes three features of the special 
sciences that support his perspectivalist justification for ontological dualism.  All three seem to involve in some 
way the dubious notion uncovered in the last chapter which illegitimately implied physicalism must account 
for how science is performed.  This is indicated in the general framing of the three features: “If scientific realism 
is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it 
is just how the world is.” (p.157).  It seems that perspectivalism is generally motivated because objective facts 
must be specified in a language, but this is only a necessary element of communication and not of the 
elements of the world (however specified) which make those facts true.   
  The three features of the special sciences are: 
(i) They are selective: their subject matter concerns only parts of the world such as organic chemistry 
being only about living things, in contrast to the entities of physics which constitute everything 
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physical.  I am not sure where to start with this item; it is a methodological tautology of science that 
it is performed by scientists and if there were no practical limitations or perhaps we had ‘all-seeing’ 
technology, then our scientific categories-or-selection might be very different, yet they would target 
the same objective truth-makers in the world (whatever makes our facts true).  This item just makes 
the scientist essential to doing science and is no threat to physicalism. 
(ii) The special sciences are teleological, or interest driven.  That scientific study is interest driven means 
nothing more than scientists aim to explain phenomena which is interesting, or which provides some 
practical facility.  Other than science inevitably falling short of explaining everything, I fail to any 
significance for ontology here.  That scientific explanations use time as a background metric is enough 
to qualify them as teleological and is simply an essential feature of our interaction with the world, and 
anyway an arbitrarily large portion of special science is concerned with synchronic phenomena.  A 
potentially more interesting observation is that science individuates processes based on targets of 
interest rather than essential start and end points in nature.  Robinson marks this to be true of the 
whole of biology and medical sciences which consist of non-atomic entities.  We might strengthen 
this claim in noting that atomistic physics reduces to quantum level physics consisting of events which 
science individuates for abstract explanatory convenience rather than any conception of objective 
start and end points.  In any case this second feature seems to be an important feature of explanation 
rather than ontology, perhaps related to Davidson’s mental events being explanatorily irreducible but 
causally impotent over and above the physical properties which constitute them. 
(iii) Many of the entities of special science are Gestalt-like phenomena.  Robinson means that we as 
perceivers determine parameters of physical similarity between entities, which might not reflect 
similarity in the way fundamental particles in physics exhibit exact sameness.  An example to illustrate 
this point could be two electrical storms only similar to the extent the weatherman catalogues them.  
Robinson is not claiming that the storms being similar is mind dependent.  There are he says using 
Dennett’s phrase ‘real patterns’ in the world, “but, like Gestalten, they are reified as being of a certain 
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kind by an interpretive act.” (p.158).  We may object to his crucial use of ‘reify’.  The meteorologist 
will not claim that a storm is anything more than a sum of basic physical properties which for 
explanatory convenience we label as a storm, and which is objectively continuous with elements that 
‘surround’ it or with which it borders.       
  Robinson believes that these three features of the special sciences suggest that logical supervenience,  
“presupposes a perspective on the subject matter, which is the viewpoint from which these 
interpretive acts take place.  [nomological] reductionism enable one to understand the special 
sciences in the light of physics without the addition of such interpretive perspectives (‘bottom-up’ 
theories).  But the perspectival approach, involving a view from outside the subject matter, seems to 
give the interpreting mind an irreducible role in the creation of these sciences.” [emphasis is mine] (2016, 
p.158). 
    
  I emphasised only the word ‘irreducible’ to highlight that part of his claim which is either not justified if he 
means to posit an ontological dualism of mind, or isn’t clear if he means by ‘role’, ‘what the mind is doing’ is 
irreducible, because no part of his argument targets the notion that the diachronic process partaken by the 
conscious mind cannot logically supervene on the physical-realizer-brain-process compatible with 
physicalism.  Indeed the whole claim would be made compatible with my earlier comments if we substitute 
‘irreducible’ for ‘ineliminable’, because all that we might rescue from Robinsons argument is that the scientist 
is an essential causal node in the formulation of those sciences which logically supervene on physics, and this 
no way offends physicalism. 
  Robinson presents what he takes to be, “Perhaps the clearest case from within science of the role of 
interpretation and imposition by our interests is the importance of function in the biological sciences.” (Ibid).  
Robinson accepts the conformity of biological explanations (that are essentially functional by only making 
sense in relation to teleological concepts like survival), with the logical supervenience of the mechanistic base 
in some way accounting for the operation of a biologically understood feature.  So far so good. “But to 
understand it within biology you need to know what it is for.  You need to know both what role the liver plays 
and how it does it.  The latter question would not arise if the former matter were not an issue.” (Ibid).  The 
functional explanation will speak to things we are interested in, without in anyway revealing the fundamental 
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physical process that is ultimately responsible for the higher-level description.  Robinson claims that this 
appears to make Fodor’s theory of non-reductive physicalism in its equivalence with logical supervenience 
essentially dualistic, because it allows the same piece of physical reality to be viewed from outside in different 
ways for different explanatory requirements.  I cannot see how this example needs be judged differently than 
I covered with my previous comments, so Robinson has not shown in any ontologically meaningful way that 
(because science cannot eliminate what he calls the ‘external perspective’) “the interpreter must transcend 
the physical world that he is interpreting” (p.159). 




















Chapter Ten.   Vagueness, realism, language and thought. 
 
 
  Robinson takes the previous chapter to have undermined physicalism either through rendering entities of 
the special sciences epiphenomenal, or by placing the mind outside the physical system.  I judged his 
arguments for the latter to be unclear by lacking the ontological import he seems to invest in them.  He will 
present further arguments that ‘place the mind outside the physical’ in this chapter from considerations about 
language but I first want to  clarify what we must take from chapter nine in regards the first claim about special 
science epiphenomenalism. 
  There is an important distinction to be made between the entities of psychology and those of the other 
special sciences in terms of their potentially undermining physicalism.  The entities of the special sciences do 
not undermine physicalism to the extent that it is unproblematic if the causal activity for example of 
hurricanes or genes or the chemical compound stability is completely constituted by their physical base 
properties.  That is, any lack of understanding about exactly how the special science properties are constituted 
by the base properties, will not put pressure on the acceptable notion that a sum of base properties is doing 
the causal work that the higher level sciences refer to as a collection within their explanatory domain.  In other 
words, those explanations which logically supervene on the physics are expected to be compatible with the 
exhaustive causal operations of the base.  This is not the case for psychology which requires that mental 
properties are causally potent over above the causal operations of the base and so they must supervene 
differently to the other sciences if psychological explanations are true because they require mental properties 
to be casually autonomous unlike special science properties.  So, Robinson cannot claim that physicalism is 
undermined by epiphenomenalism in all the special sciences, but only by epiphenomenalism in the 
psychological sciences.  The project then for non-reductive physicalists is to explain how mental properties 
can be causally potent as mental properties, because they cannot appeal to token identity with physical 
realizers as is unproblematic for the special sciences. 
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    In this chapter Robinson further presents his thesis for ‘conceptualism’: that all non-basic entities are 
dependent on a perspective which entails that those entities are mind dependent.  This thesis was clear 
enough in relation to how we might view entities in the special sciences and the utility of scientific 
perspectives but failed to show any ontological upshot.  His argument is somewhat parallel in this chapter, 
going from the logic of language and the use of vague predicates for non-basic entities he argues there cannot 
be comprehensive logical equivalence between ordinary language and discrete non-vague predicates in use 
for basic properties.  He aims to show that natural language is necessary to engage with the world and 
therefore non-basic concepts are ineliminable from a proper understanding of the world and this justifies 
ontologically reifying the perspective which generates language.   
  Like I did for Jackson’s representationalism in chapter four, I cannot fully engage all aspects of Robinson’s 
treatise for lack of room and so I must cull those elements which may be undercut without much treatment 
because they are least illuminating.  Further, it seems impossible that we can generate ontological conclusions 
from the nature of language (as we could not from scientific language) and so I will pass over the topics of 
chapter nine.10    










10 Some further ‘practical’ justification for passing over chapter 10 comes from a broad stroke objection to ideas contained 
within it from Barry Smith and Michael Martin in a long footnote on page 176.  Robinson retreats to a summary view that, 
“linguistic representation of the world is usefully messy.” 
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Chapter 11.      Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism, and realism. 
 
 
  Robinson provides a conceptualist treatment of mereological composite objects which obviously fit his 
category of non-basic entities.   Before briefly surveying his ideas about composite objects which are most 
intriguing or perhaps most suggestive of what Robinson is after, I will reaffirm and clarify how I understand 
conceptualism in relation to physicalism. 
  Physicalism does not conflict with a realist view about non-basic entities conceived by the special sciences 
(except perhaps first-person conscious properties which Robinson does not treat ‘conceptually’).  Those 
entities or properties which are conceived by science are by physicalist lights an amalgamation of physical 
entities constituting any entity useful to science and therefore compatible with any explanatory convention 
or theory of science as discovered and defined via subjective identity conditions depending on the interest of 
a scientist tracking elements of physical stuff (this long winded paragraph captures all conceptualist 
candidates that Robinson offers by undercutting all argumentation (in chapter eleven up to section seven) for 
the claim that “the composite does not exist in a realist sense, but only in a conceptualist one…the best that 
a physical realist can do.” (p.178)).  Ignorance of a lawful relation between physics and the special sciences or 
an actual lack of lawful relation (Kim, 2012) will not offend physicalism, which only need posit token identities 
related by logical supervenience.  A supporting idea which cleanly removes any potential complication about 
the nature of mind instigating non-basic entities and forestalls his claims about non-realist meaning, is that 
truths about those entities will be made true by a set of fundamental physical truths.11  Ahead in Chapter 
thirteen Robinson considers Daniel Dennett’s physicalist methodological position called the 'intentional 
 
11 The plausibility of my all-encompassing undercutting of the arguments and logical mapping in chapter eleven (sections 11.1 to 
11.3 inclusive) is strengthened by:   
a) Robinson’s bracketing off that modern portion of contemporary metaphysics (p.180) associated with a classic anthology 
Metametaphysics, edited by Chalmers (2009). 
b) Robinson’s concession that the conceptualist/realist distinction is ambiguous compared to (even the rough) difference 
which Hume characterises by worrying inside and outside of his study. (p180). 
c) Robinson believes it unhelpful to bring in formal semantics for questions of reductionism, the operations of vague 
predicates or whether predicates should be treated conceptually or realistically (p181).   
I take these simplifications combined to help clear the way for the ‘undercutting’ I have proposed. 
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stance', which exhibits some affinity with conceptualism and so will be interesting to see how Robinson 
saddles up to Dennett’s view. 
  Robinson proposes two different and intriguing supports for conceptualism.  The first explicitly challenges 
my previous proposal by arguing for the causal inefficacy of non-fundamental levels (p.181).   
  My line above holds to Jaegwon Kim’s position (2007), which Robinson labels the ‘common sense’ position 
on the causal efficacy of special science entities: that the causal powers of a house are constituted by the 
bricks that make the house.  Robinson claims that even if this is correct in terms of causal powers, the truth 
that the house exists is neutral between conceptualism and realism and conceptualism about the existence 
of the house wins support from identity conditions for the house: 
“If there really is a table there and not just atoms arranged table wise, it could, at some time have 
been constituted by at least a few different atoms from the one’s that actually constituted it.  This 
shows that there is a real difference…something grounds the identity condition difference.  The 
conceptualist has a non-mysterious account of this: it is grounded in the nature of the concept ‘table’.  
For the realist to respond ‘well, it is a table, isn’t it’ does not seem to be explanatory.” (2016, p183).  
   
  I suspect many controversial issues around identity could be relevant here for which I am unqualified and to 
which Robinson only nods with mention of Armstrong on universals, and so with another appeal to lack of 
space I will attempt adequate response as follows:  physicalism does not care what conceptual convention we 
use to determine the correctness of whether one table is the same or different from another and by definition 
atoms are qualitatively indiscernible one from the other and so substituting one or any number of atoms in a 
table will render the altered table qualitatively indiscernible from the unaltered table and absolutely the same 
in terms of its potential and actual casual powers.  Further, if the changed table is only by convention 
considered a different individual, then we are brought back to the notion that this will only show that a thinker 
applying a concept is a necessary component of that process, and that does not threaten an ontologically 
physicalist view of artefacts. 
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  The second sort of argument that Robinson presents for a conceptualist treatment of composite objects (I 
take his arguments up to section 11.7 to be of a sort captured by my comments above) comes in the form of 
a “knock down argument” (p.190) based on the strict falsehood of Newtonian science:12   
(1) Either or both of relativity and quantum theory are broadly correct. 
(2) The Newtonian picture of the world is strictly false, though workable because it approximates to the 
quantum/relativistic facts on all but the very small or very large. 
(3) Properties ascribed in the special (physical) sciences (involving space or time) are an essential part of the 
Newtonian, as opposed to quantum or relativistic pictures. 
Therefore 
(4) None of the properties ascribed to objects in the special sciences are strictly true of the world. 
(5) Concepts that are workable but do not correspond to properties that exist in the full realist sense (that 
is without conceptualisers) fit the definition of the merely conceptual. 
Therefore 
(6) The concepts of the special sciences are to be understood conceptually, not realistically. 
Robinson takes it that all special science properties are hence trivially over simplified to the extent that 
Newtonian properties are a simplification, or else we must say that special science properties are wholly real 
features of macro reality, not of micro reality, but we cannot say that because they are fundamentally false.  
I laid the simple argument out in full so the reader can judge whether I am missing something.  Even if it is the 
case that special science concepts do not coincide with amalgamations of fundamental aspects or properties 
of space time or quantum fields, why can’t we just live with physicalist notion that they are not actually real 
in some ultimate sense but they are useful approximations rather than Robinson’s insistence that they are 
made real by our conceptualising?  This need not invite anti-realism about the features of the world picked 
 
12 Author remark:  As mentioned back in the introduction I chose Robinson’s treatise as a ‘ready-made’ program of study for its 
breadth and clarity.  I was also attracted by its boldness which encourages non-expert engagement with the arguments (even 
while on a steep learning curve).  Whether Robinson’s thesis is sound or only suggestive, I admire him for sticking his neck out.  
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out by special science or by our use of artifacts, instead we may remain untroubled that we do not have a 
god’s eye view of the comprehensive physical specification of everything.   
  Robinson does not argue against Kim’s common sense position on causal powers, and so it seems 
conceptualism might only amount to a verbal dispute about what to call things, if only Robinson didn’t 
repeatedly insist on a substantial difference between real entities and those made real by our 
conceptualising which is at best unclear.     
    In the next chapter Robinson extends his conceptualist treatment to fundamental physical objects by 
proposing that there are no real physical individuals because they cannot sustain counterfactual truths of 







Chapter 12.    Why there are (probably) no physical individuals. 
 
  Robinson argues that any physical individual down to the atomic basic level will necessarily have vague 
counterfactual identity conditions, and so there will be no fact of the matter pertaining to their identity 
outside of our concepts. 
  Various scenarios are considered: such as questioning whether a five percent change in the material that 
makes up a table would render it a different individual, to questioning if a particular individual atom at the 
beginning of time when it was created had a slightly different location would be the same individual or not.  A 
somewhat summary dismissal of contending theses from Locke, Wiggins and Salmon, help motivate the idea 
that such vague identity can only sit within a representational ontology which may only be understood within 
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a conceptualist framework, and that only proper non-physical individuals such as minds will sustain a range of 
counterfactuals. 
  Robinson quickly ranges far and wide explicitly leaving aside questions about the nature of the identity 
conditions on locations as per the birth of atoms, and claiming support from quantum theory which apparently 
views quantal entities as best treated as “something less than individuals” (p.208).  A half proper treatment 
of counter factual identity would require a whole dissertation of its own and so I am pleased to leave it aside 
by reading that we can accept everything else in the treatise while objecting to this chapter (p.205).  Lack of 
space for the topic will not constrain me reapplying my earlier judgement against what Robinson wants to 
claim from it.  Even if the identity of things is dependent on our concepts, it does not follow that the stuff 
which makes up those things cannot be physical.   
  The next chapter on ‘Dennett and the human perspective’ will be the last of Robinson’s arguments for 
















Chapter 13.    Dennett and the human perspective. 
 
  Robinson’s final application for conceptualism is Dennett’s instrumentalism and ‘moderate realism’.  Dennett 
is after a physically reductive account of intentional mental content (1987), and like the earlier chapter on 
Davidson I will only be concerned with the support Robinson wants to take for his position and with Dennett’s 
theory only that extent.  It will be helpful again to frame my resistance to Robinson’s conceptualism as he 
poses it in this chapter:   
“…the ontologies of the physical world, other than the most basic one, must be understood in a 
conceptualist, as opposed to a realist, sense, and that this leads to a dualism within the physical realist 
framework, for conceptualism of this sort presupposes a human perspective on to the physical world from 
outside of it.” (2016, p.210).   
 
My resistance can be summarised by pointing to the inaccuracy of citing a presupposition of the human 
perspective.  I see conceptualism as tautologous to the effect that a perspective is simply  required in the 
world (rather than presupposed) to generate ‘non-basic’ concepts, and it is far from clear why that required 
perspective need be from outside the physical world.   
  Where Robinson describes conceptualism, “as the irreducibility of the cartesian perspective: it forces us to 
see the thinking subject as something different from, and in addition to, the realm of physical objects.” (Ibid), 
I only see conceptualism equating to the requirement for a perspective for a cartesian perspective, and 
ineliminable perspective does not amount to irreducibility.  Robinson claims that conceptualism parallels 
Dennett’s physicalist argument for the ineliminability of the intentional perspective (for understanding mental 
content) in a way that provides a concession to conceptualism by making the Cartesian perspective 
ineliminable.  But as per my previous thought, ineliminability will not support Robinson’s notion regarding a 
‘presupposing’ of the human perspective ‘from outside’, and so I claim no concession is earned.  Robinson is 
trading on the causal equivalency he illegitimately conceives for psychology with the other special sciences.  
The problems besetting Dennett’s theory arise from his target of intentionality as an aspect of consciousness, 
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but those problems do not apply to a Dennett style treatment of non-basic properties as Robinson needs for 
the concession he claims (p.212). 
  Dennett’s theory may suffer from an internal regress due to his analysis of intentionality essentially involving 
an intentional perspective and his strategy to avoid this regress is to somehow connect intentional features 
with real patterns in the world.  Robinson objects to this move because he claims those patterns are also mind 
dependent, and in effect they would not be those patterns if it were not for the perceiving mind, and so he 
seems to saddle science with the same regress due to the intentionality of minds that perform science: "the 
foundations of these judgments of similarity -- the movements of bodies in space -- are entirely real, but their 
reification as patterns -- as seen as unities of a certain sort -- involves the action of mind" (p. 217).   
  Robinson’s has interesting arguments for the mind dependence of patterns in general, to the extent that 
Dennett’s patterns might escape the regress.  Robinson proposes a conflict in Dennett’s claim that patterns 
are objectively there in their own right “irrespective of anything dependent on the subject” (p.216), because 
Dennett also relies on the notion that those patterns are only discriminable from a perspective.  Robinson 
may be correct about this tension when the pattern is united through an exercise of intention exhibited in a 
behaviour, but he is not correct about patterns in general, “…where there is genuine physical similarity.” 
(p.217). 
  Robinson takes the case of a collection of dots on a piece of paper in the shape of a circle from our 
perspective which, “…a visually more sophisticated mind might see as a polygon with the appropriate number 
of sides.  Patterns are reified by the action of the mind.  Otherwise – in the case of dots – there are just dots 
in certain physical places.” (p.217).  As in a previous chapter the suspicious move is to suggest the pattern is 
reified by the mind.  I claim nothing can be reified by the action of a mind which has no effect on those 
materials which partially effect the reification (for arguments sake in conjunction with the mind).  Everything 
which constitutes the pattern is there all along and all that is added to the situation is a mind required to 
perceive a pattern already existing.  A consequence of Robinson’s view is a potential quantity of distinct 
patterns without limit just in that collection of dots, owing to innumerable potential vantage points from 
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different perspectives of distance and size from which that collection may be viewed.  This implies a case of 
potentially cascading reification of patterns only dependent on perspectives that could be taken while those 
dots remain just what they are.  These patterns require nothing more than perspectives, and nothing in those 
patterns need be ‘presupposed’.  Perhaps this bizarre consequence will not embarrass Robinson who finds 
the ultimate explanation in substance dualism which he takes to be part motivated by this thesis of 
conceptualism.  
  I am reminded to make use of the old thought experiment about the falling tree in the forest and the whether 
it makes a sound if nobody experiences the event.  Absolutely all conditions are present in the objective 
‘pattern’ that would cause a sound if an ear was there to be affected by those conditions, but without an ear 
there is no pattern experienced and therefor no sound.  A sound depends for its existence on being heard, 
and the hearer brings nothing to those conditions which cause that sound other than satisfying the 
requirement of being there.  The only sense in which a pattern is ‘reified’ by an observer is in being seen by 
an observer, such as when one’s attention shifts between the rabbit and duck in the famous experiment or 
when we see a face in the clouds. 
 
  This concludes part two of the dissertation.  Physicalism is not undermined by conceptualism per se.   











Part Three.   Mental Substance. 
 
  Ninety percent of this dissertation is complete, in which I have attempted some level of rigor treating the 
knowledge argument and then Robinson’s conceptualism.  I risk less rigour with the remaining word count in 
taking up Robinson’s core argument for mind as immaterial substance, so making room a couple of more 
intriguing ideas which are tabled.  This positive part of Robinson’s treatise takes up only ten percent of the 
book and must be viewed more as a preliminary for the position because substance dualism involves 
numerous and substantial issues which are not mentioned (see Loose et al, 2018). 
  Most or all of Robinson’s arguments for conceptualism he claims are consistent with property dualism, but 
now he will press for the mind as immaterial substance.  The notion of substance is loaded going back to 
Aristotle, but Robinson proposes a simple model for now;  instead of the brain hosting bundles of mental 
properties which only exist because of the brain, the mind as an immaterial substance can be thought to some 
degree causally dependent on the brain but not conceptually dependent; In the way a particular roundness 
property of a ball only exists with that ball it belongs to, the ball thought of as substance could exist without 
that particular roundness property.13 
  Robinson’s argument for substance dualism is different from the approach instigated by Descartes, and is 
intended to avoid two main controversies concerning the theory of modality and the ‘Cartesian theatre’ which 
separates the inner mental life from the external world.  Robinson’s argument contests that, “…bundle 
dualism [which seemingly for argument sake he equates with property dualism]  -  the theory that the mind 
is not a substance but only a collection of immaterial properties or states – cannot accommodate certain 
essential features of personal identity – what makes a person the particular person that he or she is.” (2016, 
p.235).  This is the core argument that I will be quick about.  More fascinating than his argumentation for mind 
 
13 This bare-bones model of ‘substance’ is all I will fit, and accepting Robinson’s authority (2020) to the extent that his claims 
may be treated separately from potential background controversy about substance per se. 
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as a substance is the further contention that the mind is “a simple substance – one of the world’s atomic 
entities, though in a rather special sense.” (Ibid).   
  Robinson’s core argument concerns identity in terms of counterfactual circumstances of origin.  He takes his 
previous arguments regarding the origin of component parts of a ship to show that there may be no fact of 
the matter whether a certain ship would be the same ship if a proportion of it as different by different origin.  
He claims we may accept an overlap of constitution for the ship, and likewise for a human body; in these cases 
natural language or intuition cannot decide if the body is the same or not, however the same is not true in 
the case of identity of a mind, which chimes with ideas of Madell: that one’s present consciousness or any 
state of present consciousness we might imagine either belongs to you or it does not, with no indeterminacy 
or question of degree (1981, p.91).  Robinson thinks an overlap of mental constitution must happen in the 
form of overlapping psychic constitution, but the notion of numerically identical psychic parts overlapping 
cannot be applied in the way it applies to bodily parts (p.237).  He explains that, unlike the notion of a person’s 
body being twenty five percent different at origin, there seems no sense in the parallel question for mental 
identity: if we pose a twenty five percent change in mental life, which mental events constitute the identical 
seventy five percent? Or how might we imagine a person with a “ghostly” (p.237) seventy five percent of 
mental presence?   
  Other dualist theories argue by doubting the notion of mental identity over time instead of origin by 
questioning similarity of identity under different experiential history, using a notion Robinson calls 
‘empathetic distance’; in effect, how much connection might one imagine under a possible alternative life 
history?  How would my identity be affected if I received a telephone call yesterday with good or bad news? 
– presumably not much (Lund 2014).  How would my identity be affected if I chose to support the Blues when 
I was young? – maybe quite allot by suffering more than I did supporting the Villa.  We can at least imagine 
alternative life histories using empathetic distance, in contrast to questions with counterfactual circumstances 
of origin.  Robinson suggests there is no empirical traction for imagination to get going for alternative origin 
questions, because we have no basis to ground feasible thought experiments say for a person born from 
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different ovum but with exactly the same life experience as me:  would that person be me?  In the end, this 
demonstrates a strong intuition according to Robinson that fundamental physical facts in the world do not 
determine psychic identity.   
  The concept of haecceitas is evoked by Robinson, which might entice an advance from cognitive-blankness 
if it is more than mystery-mongering as many apparently hold it to be: “Haecceitas translates as ‘thisness’ and 
is, according to certain philosophers, the features of an object which, additional to its ordinary properties, 
makes an individual thing the particular that it is.” (2016, p.239).  Robinson wants to use this concept to help 
derive his view that there is always a matter of fact governing whether a purported counterfactual person is 
identical to oneself because individual minds exhibit haecceitas in a sense that: 
“…we all understand, namely our identity as subjects. It is because we intuitively understand this that 
we feel we can give a clear sense to the suggestion that it would, or would not, have been ourselves 
to which something had happened, if it had happened; and that we feel we can understand very 
radical counterfactuals - e.g. that I might have been an ancient Greek or even a non-human - 
whereas such radical counterfactuals when applied to mere bodies - e.g. that this wooden table 
might have been the other table in the corner or even a pyramid, makes no intuitive sense.” (p.239) 
Robinson claims that there is sense to be made of the question whether one could exist in another body, “…it 
seems to have content – in a way that a similar suggestion for mere bodies does not.”  When I attempt to 
imagine myself born in another country for example, I just don’t sense how to begin pondering that, other 
than by attempting a shallow-looking-out-in-my-current-mood-but-in-a-different-place kind of a way, which 
only seems carry more content or intuitive sense than the attempt to think about the table because some 
incoherence threatens my imagining that table I am looking at, as the other table.  The essential property 
instanced with my minimal cogito looking out on the world can be imaginatively separated from my body, but 
the parallel exercise does not go through for the table.  At best this just brings us back to those Cartesian 
problems about imagination and conceivability which this approach was meant to avoid.  I am left with the 
sense that there is something to Robinson’s argument and his evocation of haecceitas, but it does not seem 
to generate any more-hefty-idea than was provided by Descartes.   
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  One might approach this notion by imagination or thought experiments about subjective identity ‘from the 
inside’ so to speak.  Doing so inclines me to question the order of explanation in play prior to the notional 
relevance of empathetic distance.  I cannot get a handle on indeterminacy when I think about a subject either 
being me or not being me.  Robinson does not rely on Cartesian arguments for dualism partly because they 
involve deep controversy about imagination and possibility, but he seems to dig an even deeper hole with this 
approach – I cannot decide if the intrigue I sense is because he is onto something or because there is nothing 
to think about?  I experience a kind of cognitive blankness with a poised resistance to judge.  Is that just a 
failure of my imagination or an inability to reason about such things, or both?  I will leave that for the reader 
to decide, because there may be mileage to be gained with David Lewis that I can only touch on. 
  There may be a way into the question of personal haecceitas ‘from the inside’ with the framework of Lewis’s 
possible worlds along with analysis of persistence conditions on identity (Ninan, 2009).  Robinson blatantly 
assumes the falsity of Lewis’s counterpart analysis and possible worlds metaphysics, presumably because of 
the realist understanding of possible worlds.  Without taking up Ninan’s analysis I will just note that there may 
be mileage in thinking about de se possibilities which relate to haecceitas of personal identity in a way 
purportedly compatible with physicalism.  However, Ninan concedes that there may not be much to say to 
the likes of Robinson (“Nagel, Blackburn, Madell.” (p.460)) by way of intuition that would change his mind.   
  Robinson claims that a projectivist view about possibilities under which judgements about counterfactuals 
are neither true or false but instead are expressive of attitudes is compatible with his view that physical objects 
and minds must be treated fundamentally different under counterfactual judgments, because those 
projections underdetermine real differences (p.243).   
  Robinsons core proposal that counterfactual identity facts in the case of minds enjoy a reality in a way that 
such claims about physical objects do not, is not decisive – beyond the intuition that only-me-as-I-exist-right-
now-could-be-me.  But for what it is worth, as far as that intuition goes, it is as clear as any proposition one 
could imagine, perhaps because it is maximally primitive and obviously true, as Descartes famously noticed. 
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  I come now to the final section of the chapter and my dissertation, which is more intriguing than 
counterfactuals of origin stuff and may provide a finish with fascinating flourish.  It is metaphysically 
speculative and concerns what might be said regarding what immaterial consciousness is, or how we might 
further characterise it beyond saying that it is not physical?  The issues involve the purported property of 
consciousness being a simple unity.14 
  One problem for the idea that the conscious mind is a substance is accounting for the intermittency of 
consciousness during periods of deep sleep or general anaesthetic.  Strawson (2009) proposes that the self 
may be composed of innumerable selves each consisting in a span of attention at different times. Robinson 
offers a more elegant if less naturalistic solution to this problem via consideration of a different problem 
confronting the theory of the self being a simple substance lacking parts:  How can the conscious human 
subject be understood as a simple entity when that subject enjoys such an array of capacities and faculties 
with unlimited beliefs, hopes, memories, etc?  Robinson approaches this problem “…by considering the ‘unity 
in diversity’ that is an essential feature of thought.” (2016, p245).  
  In attending to how a thought is delivered by a sentence, one is aware of the content of that thought as a 
whole, while the expression of that content as a sentence takes place over time.  Robinson develops this idea 
in support of an argument by Peter Geach, that the “activity of thinking cannot be assigned a position in the 
physical time-series.” (1969, p.34).  That one must be conscious of the whole thought to deliver a sentence 
demonstrates: “Something that has an essential unity finds expression in something that is complex.” (p.245).  
The claim is that the experience of thinking is spread out ‘alongside’ the flow of empirical time over which the 
sentence is expressed, and in some sense the thought is prior to the sentence (not necessarily before) and 
with a unity unpossessed by a string of sounds constituting a sentence. 
 
14 The notion of consciousness being simple and unitary in the sense to be discussed is quite intuitive to me, while being difficult 
to pin down more analytically.  Twelve years ago, I sat passively as an outsider at the back of a Birmingham seminar room while 
Galen Strawson gave a talk on this topic.  Near the start, A scientifically oriented post-doc philosopher impatiently pressed 
Strawson for a definition of ‘simplicity’ as it was being used to characterise consciousness.  He was encouraged to attend the 




  Robinson concedes that this is a quite mysterious doctrine, but that it does accord with the phenomenology 
of thinking and to that extent I agree with him.  I wonder if we can make progress by considering the 
phenomenology of hearing a sentence.  There is also the experience of the received thought ‘emerging’ only 
once the sentence is complete (if say an unanticipated verb or noun comes at the end).  Having never carefully 
attended to the phenomenology of thinking in relation to hearing, I just now switched on the radio to do just 
that.  There is a sense in which we consolidate the words down to their essential gist and one is left with an 
idea without the memory of the component words.  This could just indicate that we do not think with words 
rather than it purportedly showing some incommensurate time scale for thought.  It is not obviously 
implausible to explain the ‘wholistic’ phenomenology of thought in relation to vocalised or heard words, just 
by way of different cognitive faculties operating in tandem, and we are not able to parse the time metric for 
thinking as we can for the vocalised sentence.  This would seem to be amenable to empirical research under 
the assumption that we lack sensitivity required to parse our thinking in a clocked fashion.  Robinson’s idea 
that thinking is in some sense timeless and because of that happens outside physical events is unclear and 
can be resisted along the lines I suggest. 
  He draws support for the idea (that I here put in a more tractable form which does not force either a 
physicalist or dualist context and perhaps holds off my previous simple style of objection), that ‘thinking does 
not meaningfully coincide with clock time’, from the greater counter-intuitiveness that comes with ways we 
might try to avoid the idea.  A prominent example of which is by Jerry Fodor who treated thinking as a 
computational process. 
  Fodor (1975; 1979) apparently treated “consciousness as irrelevant to thought, which is a computational 
process carried out in the purely formal ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) in the brain” (2016, p.245).  To cut a long 
story short which could otherwise range over a large literature in the Philosophy of Language, Robinson sides 
with Chomsky of fifty years ago whose theory is offered to demonstrate a consequence of LOT or indeed any 
natural language that must be driven purely by syntax, that so much of our vocabulary would need to be 
innate.  Robinson takes from this that a grasp on meaning and understanding of coherent life projects must 
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depend on something more than “neural/computational machinery” (Ibid), which implicates a single self 
(substance) existing over time, and impossible to be grounded in physical stuff.  Robinson steers this sketch 
back to his idea about thought not operating on physical time, by remarking that Strawson’s ephemeral selves 
who occupy spans of time cannot account for the unity we feel pursuing our projects as single selves.  In 
thinking about how the essentially conscious self must exist during periods of purported inactivity, he again 
draws on Geach to locate a potential solution which casts doubt on our common-sense understanding of 
temporal relations and time.  Geach would diagnose my earlier resistance to entertain the timelessness of 
thought as driven by a: 
 “(perhaps unacknowledged) assumption of a Newtonian or Kantian view of time: time is taken 
to be logically prior to events, events, on the other hand, must occupy divisible stretches or else 
indivisible instants of time.  If we reject this view and think instead in terms of time-relations, then 
what I am suggesting is that thoughts have not got all the kinds of time-relations that physical events, 
and I think also sensory processes, have.” (1969, p.35). 
   
 Robinson’s suggestion is that physical time might be derived from, or less fundamental than, the relation 
amongst events that relate objects and occurrences which do not take place in what we think of as physical 
time.   
  Robinson (2007) develops this understanding of time to explain how the simplicity and unity of the self could 
seem to express itself as a diversity with reference to ideas about the atemporality of God whose “…relation 
to the physical world could be cognitive and volitional, without any temporal component.” (2007, p.60).  I 
offer a rejoinder that this notion of time cannot help Robinson’s proposal for substance dualism like it 
elsewhere might support or cohere with his idealism or the atemporality of God.  I claim his notion about time 
actually requires idealism for his argument to go through, or at least requires a non-realism about physical 
time, which he has ruled out with his contention that immaterial substance is casually related to the physical.  
That is enough to implicate realism about physical time (whether or not non-basic in relation to mental 
events); because it means that the interaction between mental and physical substance does coincide with 
clock time to the extent determined by the physical aspect of the causal event.  Robinson cannot readily table 
this mysterious doctrine about time consistently with his substance dualism.   
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  My argument that Robinson’s ideas about time might better fit within an idealist theory could also be said 
about his ‘conceptualism’ of previous chapters.  This prompts me to wonder if Robinson’s overarching impetus 
is an attempt to motivate his preferred metaphysic of idealism, with naturalistically friendly-looking ideas that 
tentatively support the half-way house of substance dualism: 
“I shall argue in the final chapter that the individuality of mind is what makes possible the 
understanding of other things in individualised terms.  This picture paves the way for idealism, though 
that will be a topic for another work.” (p.205).   
 
  While Robinson’s case for substance dualism is only suggestive, I am pleased to have chosen his clear and 
wide-ranging treatise for the education it has provided me about the mind-body problem, and I am much the 





















  I am persuaded that the standard physicalist responses to the knowledge argument which I considered in 
part one are not adequate to answering Chalmer’s or Robinson’s take on the hard problem of consciousness.  
The notion of knowledge-by-acquaintance which I broached in Chapter five, recorded at least since Russell, 
seems perhaps the best approach to defend physicalism from the knowledge argument.  
  Neither Robinsons ideas about reduction in the sciences, or his related ‘conceptualist’ thesis about the mind 
dependence of certain entities, show with the clarity he claims that “the interpreter must transcend the 
physical world that he is interpreting.” (2016, p.159).  Those ideas therefore do not license or clearly motivate 
the notion of mental substance.   
  To the extent that Robinson’s case for substance dualism in the final chapter trades on his positive arguments 
(aside from his criticism of alternative theories), it is very intriguing but only a suggestive preliminary for a 
fuller account which he plans to offer in the future.  I am pleased to have chosen his clear and well scoped 
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